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[623] 
Collective Liberty 
Josh Blackman* 
The story of our Constitution is a tale of two liberties: individual freedom and collective 
freedom. The inherent tension between these two is well known. Judicial protection of 
individual liberty inhibits the collective from freely arranging society through the 
democratic process. In contrast, judicial protection of this collective freedom to structure 
society may infringe on individual liberty, especially for those out of the mainstream. 
Like a pendulum, over the last century, the rights of free speech and exercise have swung 
between the individual and the collective, between right and left. This Article traces these 
arcs from individual liberty to collective liberty, and back. 
 
Historically, progressives tended to favor broad conceptions of individual rights with 
respect to protecting unpopular speech and minority religious groups. Conservatives, in 
contrast, often disfavored such rights to the extent they impeded the preservation of 
traditional social norms and structuring society. In recent years there has been a reversal, 
as the right has asserted the mantle of individual liberty against claims of governmental 
intrusion into time-honored institutions. But for the left, a robust freedom of speech and 
religion—no longer serving progressive causes of social justice and equality—can now 
more easily be subordinated to what Justice Breyer referred to as “collective” liberty. 
 
By looking at two controversial cases in this arena—McCutcheon v. FEC and Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby Stores—this Article chronicles the juxtaposition of positions on the right 
and left, between collective and individual views of rights. This Article concludes by 
explaining what this means for the development of the First Amendment on the Roberts 
Court, as freedom from government clashes with freedom by government. 
  
 
 * Associate Professor, South Texas College of Law, Houston. I thank the attendees at the Yale 
Law School Freedom of Expression Scholars Conference, as well as Floyd Abrams, Jack Balkin, Katie 
Eyer, Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Rick Garnett, Rick Hasen, Adam Liptak, Tamara Piety, Andrew Tutt, 
and many others. 
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Introduction 
The story of our Constitution is a tale of two liberties: individual 
freedom and collective freedom. The inherent tension between these two 
is well known. Judicial protection of individual liberty inhibits the 
collective from freely arranging society through the democratic process. 
In contrast, judicial protection of this collective freedom to structure 
society may infringe on individual liberty, especially for those out of the 
mainstream. This dynamic is particularly true for the First Amendment’s 
guarantees of free speech and exercise. With respect to free speech, there 
is a never-ending struggle between the protection of speech, and the 
state’s efforts to police the social costs of those expressions. For the 
freedom of exercise, the balance is struck between the state’s efforts to 
evenhandedly apply the law, and still respect individual conscience. 
For these rights, depending who and when you ask, it was the best of 
times, it was the worst of times. Like a pendulum, over the last century 
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they have swung between the individual and the collective. Free speech 
started as a collective right that was protected so long as majoritarian 
politics deemed that it promoted the goals of society.1 But soon, this right 
evolved to one of individual liberty, where the speech was protected for 
its own sake.2 Not because it served any higher democratic goals—and 
often it was antiestablishment3—but because the value of speech 
outweighed its negative externalities.4 Yet, in recent years, as fears of the 
harms from dangerous speech have grown,5 this pendulum is on the 
precipice of swinging back toward “collective speech.”6  
The freedom of exercise has fallen through a more complicated 
trajectory, yet it winds up in a similar position. Five decades ago, free 
exercise emerged to protect religious minorities from the democratic 
process that did not sanction, and indeed imposed, a “substantial 
burden” on their beliefs.7 But this pendulum eventually swung to the 
other side when the Supreme Court held that it was up to the political 
process to provide special protections for specific faiths, and not the First 
Amendment.8 That same political process quickly tugged the pendulum 
back toward the individual; the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
provided that free exercise of religion could not be substantially 
burdened, even through the application of laws of general applicability.9 
However, as the government reached its arm further into faith, the 
beneficiaries of this law trended away from those of minority faiths, to 
those of mainstream faiths. Today, the robust protection of free 
exercise—that only recently enjoyed overwhelming support—is poised to 
swing back toward the collective: faith is protected so long as it does not 
interfere with the state’s broader goals of equality and social justice.10 
This Article traces the arcs from individual liberty to collective 
liberty, and back. Historically, progressives tended to favor broad 
conceptions of individual rights, with respect to protecting unpopular 
 
 1. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 
216–17 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 
47, 51–52 (1919). 
 2. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 3. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
 4. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453 (2011); Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 
2729, 2734 (2011); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010). 
 5. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Sorrell v. IMS 
Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2771 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 6. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1467 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 7. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 408–10 (1963). 
 8. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 889–90 (1990). 
 9. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb to 2000bb-4). 
 10. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2805–06 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
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speech and minority religious groups. Conservatives, in contrast, often 
opposed such rights to the extent they impeded the preservation of 
traditional social norms and structures. In recent years there has been a 
reversal, as the right has claimed the mantle of individual liberty against 
claims of governmental intrusion into their time-honored institutions. 
But for the left, a robust freedom of speech and religion—no longer 
serving progressive causes of social justice—can now more easily be 
subordinated to the “generalized conception of the public good.”11 This 
Article provides a framework to understand the reversal of these values. 
Part I contrasts individual speech and collective speech through the 
lens of McCutcheon v. FEC. In McCutcheon, Justice Breyer’s dissent 
referred to the freedom of speech, not only as the “individual’s right to 
engage in political speech, but also the public’s interest in preserving a 
democratic order in which collective speech matters.”12 This notion of a 
“collective” First Amendment was emphatically rejected by the majority 
opinion, which explained that “the First Amendment safeguards an 
individual’s right to participate in the public debate through political 
expression and political association.”13 Chief Justice Roberts retorted, 
“there are compelling reasons not to define the boundaries of the First 
Amendment by reference to such a generalized conception of the public 
good.”14 
With respect to speech, modern-day liberalism seems to be drifting 
away from protecting individual freedom, and more toward 
constitutionally guaranteeing equality. As Floyd Abrams opined, the 
dissent offers a very troubling vision of free expression that is “deeply 
disquieting.”15 The progressive preference for collective liberty is evident 
in the ACLU’s decision not to file a brief in McCutcheon, reflecting a 
long-simmering divide among its members. In contrast, conservatives 
seized on expanded speech rights to repel this creeping control. The 
McCutcheon opinions, and their supporting briefs, signal a shifting trend 
in progressive and conservative thought on the First Amendment and 
individual liberty more generally. 
Part II contrasts individual exercise and collective exercise through 
the lens of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores. In this case, we witnessed a 
reorientation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”). 
Introduced in Congress by Senator Ted Kennedy and then-Representative 
Chuck Schumer, and signed into law by President Bill Clinton in 1993, 
 
 11. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1449. 
 12. Id. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 13. Id. at 1448 (emphasis added). 
 14. Id. at 1449 (emphasis added). 
 15. Floyd Abrams, Symposium: Opposing More Speech—A Disturbing and Recurring Reality, 
SCOTUSBlog (Apr. 4, 2014, 2:38 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/04/symposium-opposing-
more-speech-a-disturbing-recurring-reality/. 
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RFRA was crafted as a bipartisan legislative override of Justice Scalia’s 
unpopular decision in Employment Division v. Smith.16 The law was 
perhaps intended as a shield to protect religious minorities, such as 
Native Americans who use sacramental peyote, from laws that infringe 
on their exercise. Fast forward two decades, and RFRA is now wielded 
as a sword to enforce the religious identities of corporations that cannot 
be burdened by the Affordable Care Act’s (“ACA”) contraceptives 
mandate. In her dissent in Hobby Lobby, Justice Ginsburg highlighted 
the divide, focusing on how the Court’s accommodation of the religious 
liberties of Hobby Lobby would have an impact on “thousands of 
women . . . who do not share the corporation owners’ religious faith.”17 
For Ginsburg, the collective needs of society for covered contraception 
easily trumped religious liberty. The majority opinion, which begrudgingly 
assumed that employee-provided insurance for contraception was a 
compelling interest, viewed the calculus entirely backwards. 
Part III charts the progression of speech and exercise on both the 
right and the left by posing three questions: Who is benefiting? Who is 
harmed? What is the purpose of the right? In the past, liberal justices 
have offered robust protection for free speech and exercise rights when 
the beneficiaries were the proverbial “have-nots.” Today, the scenario 
has reversed as conservatives offer strong protections for the speech and 
exercise rights of the “haves.” Contrast the hippie wearing a “Fuck the 
Draft” jacket with the millionaire donor Shaun McCutcheon. Or the 
Seventh-Day Adventist who could not work on Saturday with Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc. that refused to cover certain contraceptives for female 
employees. A corollary to the beneficiary of the right is who bears the 
cost. Earlier cases offered easy and cheap accommodations, such as 
providing unemployment benefits to the Seventh-Day Adventist. Hobby 
Lobby presents a different calculus, where the cost is borne by female 
employees who would not receive coverage for contraceptives. This 
Article closes by looking at the recent debate over Indiana’s Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, which serves as a harbinger for the growing 
debate between liberty and equality in the wake of Obergefell v. Hodges.18 
I do not attempt to create a unifying theory of the First 
Amendment, nor do I try to explain all of this century’s developments in 
free speech and exercise doctrine. Rather, by looking at two of the most 
recent and controversial cases in this arena—McCutcheon v. FEC and 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby—this Article chronicles the juxtaposition of 
positions for collective and individual views of rights. This Article 
addresses what these changes mean for the development of the First 
 
 16. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or., 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 17. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2787 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 18. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1039 (2015). 
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Amendment on the Roberts Court, as freedom from government clashes 
with freedom by government. 
I.  Collective Speech 
The divide between individual and collective speech—though a 
battle that has been waged for nearly a century—was crystallized by the 
dueling opinions in McCutcheon v. FEC between Justice Breyer and 
Chief Justice Roberts. Justice Breyer’s dissent relies on progressive-era 
precedents, bolstered by dubious founding-era sources, to make the case 
that the First Amendment was designed to promote “democracy” through 
“collective speech.”19 The Chief Justice, writing for the Court, counters 
that the First Amendment protects an individual right, independent of its 
utilitarian value.20 The majority and dissent represent the newly drawn 
battle lines, where conservatives now claim the mantle that “speech is 
speech,” and liberals support the power of the state to restrict speech that 
is not necessary to “democracy.” As reflected by the evolving position of 
the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) on campaign finance 
reform, the sands of the First Amendment continue to shift, while both sides 
dig into their trenches. 
A. MCCUTCHEON V. FEC 
McCutcheon v. FEC considered the constitutionality of the annual 
contribution aggregate limit for individuals of “$123,200 to candidate and 
noncandidate committees during each two-year election cycle.”21 Though 
often dubbed in the media as the sequel to Citizens United v. FEC,22 the 
case had nothing to do with corporate speech. It involved an individual, 
Shaun McCutcheon, who sought to contribute to more candidates that 
the aggregate limit cap allowed.23 
In a 5-4 decision, the Court per Chief Justice Roberts found “that 
the aggregate limits do little, if anything, to . . . [combat corruption], 
while seriously restricting participation in the democratic process.”24 As a 
result, “[t]he aggregate limits are therefore invalid under the First 
Amendment.”25 This 5-4 split was effectively the same breakdown that 
 
 19. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1467. 
 20. Id. at 1438. 
 21. Id. at 1443. 
 22. Josh Voorhees, SCOTUS Strikes down Aggregate Campaign Donor Limits, Slate (Apr. 2, 
2014, 10:50 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2014/04/02/scotus_donor_limit_case_high_court_s_ 
mccutcheon_opinion_strikes_down_the.html. 
 23. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434. 
 24. Id. at 1442. 
 25. Id. 
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fractured the Court with Citizens United four years earlier, with Justice 
Kagan donning the robe of the now-retired Justice Stevens.26 
Penning the dissent on behalf of the liberal bloc of the Court was 
Justice Breyer. The dissent would have upheld the aggregate limits in 
recognition of the “importance of protecting the political integrity of our 
governmental institutions.”27 Mincing no words, Justice Breyer concluded 
that “[t]aken together with Citizens United, today’s decision eviscerates 
our Nation’s campaign finance laws, leaving a remnant incapable of 
dealing with the grave problems of democratic legitimacy that those laws 
were intended to resolve.”28 None of this should have come as any 
surprise in light of the divide in Citizens United. But then a funny thing 
happened on the way to campaign finance utopia.29 In justifying the 
aggregate limit, the First Amendment was whittled down from an individual 
right to a collective privilege. Justice Breyer referred to the freedom of 
speech, not only as an “individual’s right to engage in political speech, 
but also the public’s interest in preserving a democratic order in which 
collective speech matters.”30 A careful examination of Justice Breyer’s 
opinion reveals a subtle, but deliberate framework to reorient the freedom 
of expression and civil liberties writ large. 
1. Justice Breyer’s Progressive Throwback 
The dissent’s analysis begins innocuously enough: “Consider at least 
one reason why the First Amendment protects political speech.”31 Breyer 
adds “[s]peech does not exist in a vacuum.”32 Though described as “not a 
new idea,” these two understated sentences from the usually verbose 
Breyer would effect a revolution in First Amendment jurisprudence.33 By 
bifurcating “political” speech from “nonpolitical” speech, and stressing 
that speech need not exist for its own sake, Breyer extracts the fragile 
golden spike that united the Promontory Point of the First Amendment. 
For the dissent, speech is to be judged based on its character and utility 
for greater social goods, such as democracy. 
To justify this bold departure from modern First Amendment 
jurisprudence, Breyer dials back the First Amendment not to the heyday 
of the Warren and Burger Courts—the apogee of free speech 
protections—but to the Progressive Era. First, Justice Breyer pays 
 
 26. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 393 (2010). Coincidentally, Citizens United was the first 
case Solicitor General Kagan argued and Justice Sotomayor heard. 
 27. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1465 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 28. Id. 
 29. T. Dan Smith: A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Utopia (Amber et al. 1987). 
 30. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
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homage to the crown prince of this epoch, Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr. What is the utility of “political” speech for Breyer? The First 
Amendment protects “political communication [that] seeks to secure 
government action.”34 For “[a] politically oriented ‘marketplace of ideas’ 
seeks to form a public opinion that can and will influence elected 
representatives.”35 This adaptation of the oft-cited Justice Holmes’ 
phrase “marketplace of ideas”—though limited to ideas of the political 
variety—restores a utilitarian vision of free speech that had lapsed into 
desuetude. Presumably, “political” speech that does not contribute to the 
“marketplace of ideas” and should not be used to “secure government 
action” is outside the Constitution’s protections. 
Curiously, Justice Breyer does not cite the source of the 
“marketplace of ideas”—Justice Holmes’ dissent in Abrams v. United 
States.36 Why? Because Holmes’s then-revolutionarily robust vision of the 
First Amendment is incompatible with Breyer’s stingy view of speech. In 
1919, Holmes wrote that the “ultimate good desired is better reached by 
free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought 
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is 
the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.”37 This 
sentence could have been pulled from Shaun McCutcheon’s merit brief.38 
But this is not the “theory of our Constitution” that the McCutcheon 
dissenters endorse—they could not even bring themselves to cite it! 
Next, the dissent turns to Holmes’ free speech protégé, Justice Louis 
Brandeis.39 He wrote “[e]ighty-seven years ago” the “First Amendment’s 
protection of speech was ‘essential to effective democracy.’”40 But this 
too cherry picks from Brandeis’ concurring opinion in Whitney v. 
California.41 The complete sentence Breyer omits reads: “Moreover, even 
imminent danger cannot justify resort to prohibition of these functions 
essential to effective democracy, unless the evil apprehended is relatively 
serious.”42 The essence of this statement was that speech cannot be 
limited unless it is “imminent[ly] dangerous” and “relatively serious.” 
Not that “political speech” can be limited when it is unnecessary to 
“secure government action” or that speech was protected because it was 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 37. Id. (emphasis added). 
 38. Burt Neuborne, Madison’s Music: On Reading the First Amendment 88 (2015). 
 39. See Thomas Healy, The Great Dissent: How Oliver Wendell Holmes Changed His 
Mind—and Changed the History of Free Speech in America (2013). 
 40. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 
357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)). 
 41. 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 42. Id. (emphasis added). 
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“essential to effective democracy.”43 In contrast to Breyer’s assertion, 
Brandeis writes that the “[p]rohibition of free speech and assembly is a 
measure so stringent that it would be inappropriate as the means for 
averting a relatively trivial harm to society.”44 Brandeis’ vision of the 
First Amendment was premised on “respect for the inherent dignity of 
the speaker as a human being [that] requires us to tolerate efforts at self-
expression, even when they do not help our choice-dependent institutions to 
work better.”45 Individual speech is protected regardless of whether it 
makes democracy work. 
The dissent then turns to Chief Justice Hughes’ opinion in 
Stromberg v. California.46 This case reversed a prosecution for flying a 
red flag as a symbol of “opposition to organized government.”47 Here is 
how Justice Breyer quotes the opinion: “‘A fundamental principle of our 
constitutional system’ is the ‘maintenance of the opportunity for free 
political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the 
will of the people.’”48 The dissent emphasized “to the end,” stressing the 
utilitarian nature of this speech. But what rendered the California law 
unconstitutional? It was, Chief Justice Hughes found, “so vague and 
indefinite as to permit the punishment of the fair use of this opportunity 
[for free political discussion and] is repugnant to the guaranty of liberty 
contained in the Fourteenth Amendment.”49 Not that the speech was only 
valid so long as it served “the end” that “government may be responsive” 
to, but that the statute cannot sweep so broadly to prohibit speech that 
may be useful to this end. Justice Breyer swings and misses with his 
citations to both Holmes and Brandeis, and strikes out with Hughes. 
Even so, the decision to dial back to the Progressive Era marks a 
bold departure from recent First Amendment jurisprudence. As Professor 
David Bernstein points out: 
[O]nce one adopts the Progressive view of freedom of speech as only 
going so far as to protect the public interest in a well-functioning 
marketplace of ideas, there is no obvious reason to limit reduced 
scrutiny of government ‘public interest’ regulation of speech to campaign 
finance regulations. Nor is it obvious why the Court should give strict 
scrutiny to speech restrictions that don’t directly affect the marketplace 
 
 43. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 44. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377. 
 45. Neuborne, supra note 38, at 8. 
 46. 283 U.S. 359 (1931). 
 47. Id. at 363. 
 48. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 369 
(emphasis added)). 
 49. Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 369. 
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of ideas, instead of just using a malleable test balancing ‘speech interests’ 
versus other interests.50 
If the precedents of the Warren Court concerning the First 
Amendment no longer ground the Justices, then Breyer’s “collective 
speech” goes much further than campaign finance laws. 
2. The Dissent’s Faulty Originalism 
After reimagining the views of Holmes, Brandeis, and Hughes, 
Breyer turns back the clock further to Madison, Wilson, and Rousseau. 
Breyer begins by citing the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau,51 to explain 
that the “Framers had good reason to emphasize this same connection 
between political speech and governmental action.”52 Breyer observed 
that Rousseau “argued that in a representative democracy, the people 
lose control of their representatives between elections, during which 
interim periods they were ‘in chains.’”53 Citing absolutely no evidence 
that the Framers ever even considered this statement, Breyer states that 
“[t]he Framers responded to this criticism.”54 He offers two methods that 
the Framers apparently employed to respond to this problem. (There is 
no evidence that the Framers were ever aware of either approach.) The 
first method was “requiring frequent elections to federal office.”55 There 
 
 50. David Bernstein, Breyer’s Dangerous Dissent in McCutcheon (the Campaign Finance Case), 
Wash. Post (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/04/02/ 
breyers-dangerous-dissent-in-mccutcheon-the-campaign-finance-case/. 
 51. Justice Breyer refers to Rousseau as “[a]n influential 18th-century continental philosopher,” 
but offers no evidence to support the conclusion that Rousseau had any influence on the framing 
generation or American constitutional jurisprudence more broadly. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1467 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). A search revealed only a single citation to Rousseau in the U.S. Reports, and it 
had no connection with founding-era thoughts on constitutional law. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 
131 S. Ct. 2729, 2753 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting); cf. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) 
(“Blackstone—whose works constituted the preeminent authority on English law for the founding 
generation . . . .”); Steven Menashi, Cain as His Brother’s Keeper: Property Rights and Christian 
Doctrine in Locke’s Two Treatises of Government, 42 Seton Hall L. Rev. 185 (2012) (noting the 
influence of John Locke on American property law). 
 52. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 53. Id. (citing Jean-Jacques Rousseau, An Inquiry Into the Nature of the Social Contract 
265–66 (transl. 1791)). This exact quote from Rousseau appears in Robert C. Post, Citizens Divided: 
Campaign Finance Reform and the Constitution 8 (2014) in a chapter titled “A Short History of 
Representation and Discursive Democracy.” When McCutcheon was decided on April 2, 2014, this 
book was not yet released. The book authored by the Yale Law School Dean was released on June 23, 
2014. Yet, Breyer still cited the book. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1468 (Breyer, J., dissenting). As 
discussed infra, Breyer also referenced Post’s book without citation in several other places. See Josh 
Blackman, Talk About Citing Facts Outside the Record! Justice Breyer Cites Unpublished Book in 
McCutcheon Dissent, Josh Blackman’s Blog (Apr. 19, 2014), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2014/04/19/ 
talk-about-citing-facts-outside-the-record-justice-breyer-cites-unpublished-book-in-mccutcheon-dissent/. 
 54. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Of course, Dean Post makes an 
identical point in his book. Post, supra note 53, at 8 (“The answer to Rousseau’s challenge was to 
forge a living connection between the people and their representatives.”). 
 55. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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is no further elaboration of how Senators, who served terms of six years, 
rather than two years, without any election by the people, fit within this 
mold. Second, Breyer explains, the Framers achieved this goal by “by 
enacting a First Amendment.”56 Also, there is no explanation that the 
First Amendment was not part of the original Constitution, and as the 
Court has recognized, the structural provisions of our Constitution 
operate to protect liberty even if the Bill of Rights had never been 
ratified.57 
Citing the Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States of 
America, Breyer explains that the First Amendment “would facilitate a 
‘chain of communication between the people, and those, to whom they 
have committed the exercise of the powers of government.’”58 This is a 
misleading mischaracterization of Wilson’s 1792 lecture on the 
Constitution. As Professor John McGinnis points out, Wilson’s comment 
had absolutely nothing to do with the First Amendment,59 for it was not 
free speech, but “representation” that would be the “chain of 
communication between the people.”60 McGinnis observes that Wilson 
was discussing “the novelty and virtue of representative government, as 
opposed to ‘monarchical, aristocratical, and democratical’ forms of 
government.”61 
Worse still is that Wilson was making the exact opposite point that 
Breyer cited it for. In the very next sentence, Wilson stated, “This chain 
may consist of one or more links; but in all cases it should be sufficiently 
strong and discernible.”62 As Dean Robert Post accurately notes in the 
original source Breyer relied on, “The chain of communication needed to 
be ‘sufficiently strong and discernible’ to sustain the popular conviction 
that representatives spoke for the people whom they purported to 
represent. Only in this way could the value of self-government be 
maintained.”63 McGinnis explains, “In the context of discussing the 
nature of electoral representation, Wilson posits that representation may 
be direct (one vote between the people and choice of representative) but 
may also be indirect like the Constitution’s own establishment of the 
electoral college (at least two votes between the people and the choice of 
representative).”64 Rather than establishing a direct and accountable 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012). 
 58. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing James Wilson & Thomas 
McKean, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States of America 30–31 (1792)). 
 59. John O. McGinnis, Justice Breyer Needs an Originalist Law Clerk, Libr. of L. & Liberty (Apr. 
6, 2015), http://www.libertylawsite.org/2015/04/06/justice-breyer-needs-an-originalist-law-clerk/. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Wilson, supra note 58, at 31. 
 63. Post, supra note 53, at 8 (emphasis added). 
 64. McGinnis, supra note 59. 
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democracy, our Constitution imposes many layers of separation between 
elected branches and the electorate—totally orthogonal from Breyer’s 
“democratic” vision of the First Amendment. 
Breyer next trains his sights on James Madison. Citing The 
Federalist No. 57, Breyer writes, “[t]his ‘chain’ would establish the 
necessary ‘communion of interests and sympathy of sentiments’ between 
the people and their representatives, so that public opinion could be 
channeled into effective governmental action.”65 This citation is 
confounding for several reasons. First, Breyer attempts to tie together an 
out-of-context statement Wilson made in 1792 with a phrase Madison 
never used, in a Federalist paper authored five years earlier. Second, this 
statement was made before the ratification of the Constitution, let alone 
the Bill of Rights. Third, and most importantly, Madison’s comments, 
like Wilson’s, have nothing to do with the First Amendment. In The 
Federalist No. 57, Madison was not talking about free speech, or even 
democracy, but the fact that the House of Representatives “can make no 
law which will not have its full operation on themselves and their friends, 
as well as on the great mass of the society.”66 In other words, everything 
Congress does will impact society. Indeed, Madison’s answer to this 
problem was not democracy but liberty: “the vigilant and manly spirit 
which actuates the people of America—a spirit which nourishes freedom, 
and in return is nourished by it.”67 
At the end of a string citation, Breyer references several quotes 
from James Madison during the debates over what became the First 
Amendment,68 writing that the Amendment “will strengthen American 
democracy by giving ‘the people’ a right to ‘publicly address their 
representatives,’ ‘privately advise them,’ or ‘declare their sentiments by 
petition to the whole body.’”69 Again it seems that Breyer used these 
quotations from Dean Post’s book, but entirely disregarded their context.70 
Madison made these comments in response to a proposal to include “a 
right of instruction,” that provided, “the people should have a right to 
instruct their representatives.”71 In other words, the people could tell their 
representatives how to vote, similar to how the states could instruct and 
 
 65. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1467 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing The 
Federalist No. 57, at 386 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)). 
 66. The Federalist No. 57, supra note 65, at 386 (James Madison). 
 67. Id. at 387. 
 68. It was the third proposed Amendment. 
 69. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Thomas Hart Benton, 
1 Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856 141 (1857)). 
 70. Post, supra note 53, at 12–13. 
 71. Id. 
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recall representatives under the late Articles of Confederation.72 Madison 
rejected this proposal, and argued that there was no need to specify a 
“right of instruction” because of the wide-ranging protections of what 
became the First Amendment.73 It gave “the people . . . a right to express 
and communicate their sentiments and wishes. . . . The right of freedom 
of speech is secured; the liberty of the press is expressly declared to be 
beyond the reach of this Government; the people may therefore publicly 
address their representatives, may privately advise them, or declare their 
sentiments by petition to the whole body.”74 
Madison explained that the multifaceted protections of liberty 
ensured that the people could communicate with their representatives. 
There was no need to specify a “right of instruction.” It is in this sense, 
Post writes, that “the First Amendment established a chain of 
communication that would connect the people to their representatives,”75 
and not in the narrow sense Breyer describes. As McGinnis explains, 
“Madison is actually arguing against a provision that would have 
required representatives to reflect more closely the sentiments of the 
people, thus undercutting Justice Breyer’s point that the government’s 
representatives may regulate expression to make what they claim is a 
closer connection between them and their constituents.”76 Once again, 
the history Breyer cherry picks proves just the opposite point. In 1792, 
the year after the First Amendment was ratified, James Madison 
explained the divide between these two schools of freedom. “In Europe, 
charters of liberty [have been] granted by power.”77 But in America, 
Madison counters, “charters of power have been granted by liberty.”78 
Speech was not designed to serve democracy—speech preexisted and 
exists independently of democracy. Democracy exists because of speech, 
not the other way around. 
Following this topsy-turvy magical mystery tour of the First 
Amendment, Justice Breyer finishes with a jarring, and unjustified 
conclusion: “Accordingly, the First Amendment advances not only the 
individual’s right to engage in political speech, but also the public’s 
interest in preserving a democratic order in which collective speech 
matters.”79 No such assertion was proven. The dissent adduced not a 
scintilla of evidence that this was how the First Amendment was ever 
 
 72. Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. V (“[W]ith a power reserved to each state, to recall 
its delegates, or any of them, at any time within the year, and to send others in their stead for the 
remainder of the Year.”). 
 73. The Federalist No. 57, supra note 65, at 385 (James Madison). 
 74. Post, supra note 53, at 13. 
 75. Id. (emphasis added). 
 76. McGinnis, supra note 59. 
 77. Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 55 (1992). 
 78. Id. 
 79. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1467 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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understood. A thorough search failed to discover a single instance where 
the phrase “collective speech” was ever used in the U.S. Reports. While 
this may be a salient and contemporary progressive vision of the First 
Amendment—one embraced by several prominent ACLU alumni—
attempts to support it based on the Court’s precedents, and even the 
founding generation’s views on democracy, are entirely lacking. Even Burt 
Neuborne, who agrees with Breyer’s approach to the First Amendment, 
charitably describes his theory as justified by only an “emerging intuition,” 
rather than the “text itself.”80 
3. Active Liberty and “Collective Liberty” 
On the merits, “collective speech” fares no better. To the McCutcheon 
dissenters, what determines if “political speech” is protected is whether it 
“preserv[es] a democratic order” for the “collective” good.81 Traditionally, a 
lot of speech may serve individualistic ends, and under strict scrutiny, it is 
the government’s burden to show why a compelling interest exists to 
limit that expression. It is not the individual’s burden to show that her 
expression is made pursuant to some nebulously defined common good. 
But the McCutcheon dissent turns this analysis on its head. Rather 
than protecting speech, the “collective” campaign finance laws, Breyer 
explains, “strengthen, rather than weaken” the First Amendment.82 They 
“create a democracy responsive to the people.”83 The dissent even goes 
so far as to suggest that the First Amendment favors “the expression” of 
ideas that “reflect the very thoughts, views, ideas, and sentiments” of the 
people, rather than speech that is at odds with that consensus.84 To this 
view, the First Amendment exists to ensure that all voices can be heard 
equally, not that an individual can speak. This “collective” right—better 
termed a power85—permits the state to limit speech to ensure that others 
can be heard. 
At the end of the analysis, Breyer attempts to limit the breadth of 
his dissent by noting the “potential for conflict between” the fact that 
“contributions” are needed to “pay for the diffusion of ideas,” and the 
“need to limit” those contributions “in order to help maintain the integrity 
 
 80. Neuborne, supra note 38, at 178. 
 81. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 82. Id. at 1468. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579–80 (2008) (“Three provisions of the 
Constitution refer to ‘the people’ in a context other than ‘rights’—the famous preamble (‘We the 
people’), section 2 of Article I (providing that ‘the people’ will choose members of the House), and the 
Tenth Amendment (providing that those powers not given the Federal Government remain with ‘the 
States’ or ‘the people’). Those provisions arguably refer to ‘the people’ acting collectively—but they 
deal with the exercise or reservation of powers, not rights. Nowhere else in the Constitution does a 
‘right’ attributed to ‘the people’ refer to anything other than an individual right.”). 
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of the electoral process.” Yet Breyer’s preceding analysis makes clear 
how that cookie crumbles—the democratic process can trump any 
individualistic political expression that falls outside of “collective speech.” 
These collective ideals are not novel for the former Harvard Law 
School professor. Active Liberty, Breyer’s 2007 tome, explains that the 
First Amendment is “designed to further a basic constitutional purpose: 
creating and maintaining democratic decision-making institutions.”86 
Expressions inconsistent with that goal are deemed second-class 
utterances. Breyer explained in a 2006 interview that the most important 
part of the Constitution was “basically about . . . democracy,”87 
notwithstanding the fact that “the word democracy is nowhere to be 
found in either the Constitution or the Declaration of Independence.”88 
To Breyer, “strong free speech guarantees” would “require, depriving 
the people of the democratically necessary room to make decisions, 
including the leeway to make regulatory mistakes.”89 
While McCutcheon primarily concerned so-called “political” speech, 
Breyer’s collectivist mentality is not so limited, but also extends to 
speech about “economic” or “social” matters. For the types of expression 
that warrant “especially strong pro-speech judicial presumptions” and 
“careful review” are those that “shape public opinion, particularly if that 
opinion in turn will affect the political process and the kind of society in 
which we live.”90 Other types of speech that do not serve democracy are 
not so fortunate. 
Breyer’s “solution” to the campaign finance problem requires us to 
“understand” the First Amendment “as protecting more than the 
individual’s modern freedom,” but as “seeking to facilitate a conversation 
among ordinary citizens that will encourage their informed participation 
in the electoral process.”91 That is, a collective right (or power), rather 
than an individual right. It is not about “protecting the individual from 
government restriction of information about matters that the 
Constitution commits to individual, not collective, decision-making,” but 
rather as “seeking primarily to encourage the exchange of information 
and ideas necessary for citizens themselves to shape” the “democratic 
state.”92 In other words, the First Amendment treats less favorably 
speech that affects individuals than speech that promotes “democracy.” 
 
 86. Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution 39 (2005). 
 87. Interview by Robert P. George, Professor, Princeton Univ., with Justice Stephen Breyer, in 
Princeton, N.J. (Apr. 30, 2006). 
 88. Timothy Sandefur, The Conscience of the Constitution: The Declaration of 
Independence and the Right to Liberty 5 (2014). 
 89. Breyer, supra note 86, at 41. 
 90. Id. at 42. 
 91. Id. at 46 (emphasis added). 
 92. Id. at 47 (emphasis added); see also Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. 
L. Rev. 245, 252–53 (2002). 
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With this framework, Justice Breyer tries to strike a balance between 
providing too strong of speech protection, which would “prevent a 
democratically elected government from creating necessary regulation,”93 
and too weak of speech protection, which would not allow for the “free 
exchange of ideas necessary to maintain the health of our democracy.”94 
This balancing test, which seeks to strike that happy middle ground—not 
too hot and not too cold—is less Goldilocks and more Janus. Both sides 
of the equation serve the same master: protecting speech that promotes 
democracy. If judicial protections of speech are too strong, the collective 
speech rights of society to promote democracy are hampered. If judicial 
protections of speech are too weak, the political speech rights of 
individuals to promote democracy are hampered. Both routes wind up at 
the same destination, and require judges to pick and choose what types 
of speech are consistent or inconsistent with democracy. 
4. The Conservatives Strike Back 
Responding forcefully and vigorously to Breyer’s “collective 
speech” vision of the First Amendment, ironically, was the conservative 
bloc of Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, 
Thomas, and Alito. Even more paradoxically, draping themselves in the 
First Amendment as interpreted by the Warren Court were the Justices 
who came of age seeking to roll back that generation of jurisprudence. 
Chief Justice Roberts begins his analysis by citing Cohen v. California, 
a case where the Court upheld the right of a person in courthouse to wear 
a jacket blaring “Fuck the Draft.” The First Amendment, Roberts explains, 
“is designed and intended to remove governmental restraints from the 
arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be 
voiced largely into the hands of each of us” as individuals.95 It represents 
“the belief that no other approach would comport with the premise of 
individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests.”96 
The First Amendment protects not a “collective” power of society, but 
“an individual’s right to participate in the public debate through political 
expression and political association.”97 Stressing this point, Roberts 
repeats, “[g]overnment may not penalize an individual for ‘robustly 
exercis[ing]’ his First Amendment rights.”98 The word “individual” is 
repeated throughout to emphasize the contrast. 
 
 93. Breyer, supra note 86, at 41. 
 94. Id. at 42. 
 95. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1448 (2014) (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 
(1971)). 
 96. Id. at 1448 (emphasis added). 
 97. Id. (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)) (emphasis added). 
 98. Id. at 1449 (emphasis added) (citing Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 739 (2008)). 
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After establishing that the aggregate limits were inconsistent with 
the First Amendment, Roberts directly engages with Breyer’s dissent: 
“[t]he dissent faults this focus on ‘the individual’s right to engage in 
political speech, saying that it fails to take into account ‘the public’s 
interest’ in ‘collective speech.’”99 Not so, Roberts explains: “there are 
compelling reasons not to define the boundaries of the First Amendment 
by reference to such a generalized conception of the public good.”100 The 
majority proceeds to dismantle, one plank at a time, the basis for 
Breyer’s communal freedom. 
First, the Court explains that democracy enforces the “will of the 
majority.”101 In this way, the democratic “‘collective speech’ . . . plainly 
can include laws that restrict free speech” to the extent the expression 
conflicts with majority will.102 If the democratic process deems speech 
unnecessary, “collective speech” would allow the state to eliminate the 
speech. The First Amendment, Roberts counters, exists to “afford 
individuals protection against such infringements,” not to “protect the 
government” when it “reflect[s] ‘collective speech.’”103 The First 
Amendment does not operate as an instrumental tool to protect 
deliberations, but is designed as a restraint on government itself. Speech 
is a personal, not a shared, right.104 In response to Breyer’s collective 
speech, free speech icon Floyd Abrams similarly notes that, 
[T]he core First Amendment interest is that of protecting freedom of 
expression from the government. Relegating that to a subsidiary 
position behind permitting the government, in the name of advancing 
democracy, to limit the amount of speech about who to vote for, risks 
much that the First Amendment was adopted to protect.105 
Second, the value of speech should in no way be tethered to a 
“legislative or judicial determination that [it] is useful to the democratic 
 
 99. Id. (emphasis added). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. (contrasting against United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012)); Wooley v. Maynard, 
430 U.S. 705 (1977); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)). See Timothy Sandefur, 
Wow, Talk About Getting It Backwards, FreeSpace (Apr. 2, 2014, 10:09 AM), http://sandefur.typepad. 
com/freespace/2014/04/wow-talk-about-getting-it-backwards.html. 
 104. See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579 (2008) (“The unamended Constitution and 
the Bill of Rights use the phrase ‘right of the people’ two other times, in the First Amendment’s 
Assembly-and-Petition Clause and in the Fourth Amendment’s Search-and-Seizure Clause. The Ninth 
Amendment uses very similar terminology (‘The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, 
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people’). All three of these 
instances unambiguously refer to individual rights, not ‘collective’ rights, or rights that may be 
exercised only through participation in some corporate body.”). 
 105. Ronald K.L. Collins, Guest Contributor—Floyd Abrams, “Liberty Is Liberty,” Concurring 
Opinions (Mar. 18, 2015), http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2015/03/guest-contributor-floyd-
abrams-liberty-is-liberty.html. 
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process.”106 Citing the Court’s recent 8-1 decision in United States v. 
Stevens—invalidating a federal law that prohibited depictions of animal 
cruelty—the Chief Justice restated that the “First Amendment does not 
contemplate such ‘ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits.’”107 
Or, as the Court stated a decade earlier, “‘[w]hat the Constitution says is 
that’ value judgments ‘are for the individual to make, not for the 
Government to decree, even with the mandate or approval of a majority.’”108 
Or, as the Court stated four decades earlier, “[t]he constitutional protection 
[of speech] does not turn upon ‘the truth, popularity, or social utility of 
the ideas and beliefs which are offered.”109 Speech cannot be restricted 
because the democratically elected majority thinks some things are better 
off not said. 
Third, the Court notes that our First Amendment jurisprudence 
“already takes account of any ‘collective’ interest that may justify 
restrictions on individual speech” by measuring any restrictions on 
speech “against the asserted public interest.”110 Ceding the dissent’s 
conclusion, the Chief Justice notes combating “corruption in the 
electoral process” is “no doubt . . . compelling.”111 But this is only part of 
the equation. The Court must also determine whether the restriction on 
speech is sufficiently narrowly tailored, or if it has substantial negative 
social costs to others.112 Otherwise, the regulation is presumptively 
invalid. The validity of prior restraints is the rare exception to the rule, 
not the norm. Congress can “pursue that interest only so long as it does 
not unnecessarily infringe an individual’s right to freedom of speech; [the 
Court does] not truncate this tailoring test at the outset.”113 Unlike the 
Janused scales of the dissent, burdened by the presumption of 
constitutionality, the equipoise struck by the majority exudes the 
presumption of liberty.114 
Abrams observes that a “battle . . . rages in academia and on the 
Supreme Court as to what the First Amendment is all about. And in that 
conflict . . . it is the ideological Left that seems increasingly less 
supportive of the First Amendment—or, to put it more fairly, to more 
speech or speech-like activity being protected by the First Amendment.”115 
 
 106. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1449.  
 107. Id. (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010)). 
 108. Id. at 1449–50 (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000)). 
 109. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 
445 (1963)) (emphasis added). 
 110. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1450. 
 111. Id. at 1451. The Chief Justice was more willing to combat potential corruption in judicial 
elections. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1665 (2015). 
 112. See Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of Social Cost, 34 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 951 (2011). 
 113. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1450 (emphasis added). 
 114. See Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty (2004). 
 115. Collins, supra note 105. 
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“The division between the Roberts and Breyer opinions,” Abrams notes, 
“is vast.”116 There is no doubt that “jurists on both sides of the divide care 
about both freedom of speech and democracy.”117 However, “only one 
side believes that the best protection of democracy is more rather than 
less speech.”118 This, Abrams concludes, “is a disturbing and recurring 
reality.”119 
From the other perspective, Professor Neuborne (more from him 
later), highlights the “heated exchange between” Roberts and Breyer.120 
He observes that “under current constitutional ground rules American 
judges confronted with a case having significant implications for the 
functioning of American democracy are not required—indeed, they may 
not even be permitted—to ask whether the outcome is good or bad for 
democracy.”121 Whereas Breyer grounds his opinion entirely in making 
democracy work, Roberts will not deign to even consider the 
ramifications of his decisions, placing his faith in the mantra that more 
speech will lead to the optimal outcome, whatever that may be. This 
obtuseness, or perhaps what the dissent might characterize as naïveté, 
highlights the growing divide within the First Amendment. 
B. The Shifting First Amendment 
The “collective speech” dissent in McCutcheon should not have 
come as a surprise. Over the past two decades, fissures have formed in 
the First Amendment, so much so that the most zealous defenders of free 
speech are now conservatives, and the largest critics have become 
liberals. Crystallizing this fracture has been the ACLU. After a bitterly 
divided internal vote, the ACLU at long last embraced regulations on 
speech once unthinkable by the premier civil liberties organization. The 
story of this change is a microcosm for how our First Amendment has 
shifted. 
1. The Divide in the ACLU 
For a century, the ACLU has stood at the vanguard of protecting 
civil liberties, and in particular the freedom of speech. Consider “the late 
1950s and 1960s,” a period in which the “foundation for the modern First 
Amendment” was laid by the Warren Court.122 During this era, the 
organization, and the First Amendment more broadly, enjoyed breathtaking 
successes, and the landmark First Amendment cases came, fast and furious. 
 
 116. Abrams, supra note 15. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. (emphasis added). 
 120. Neuborne, supra note 38, at 74. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 111. 
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In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,123 the Court found that “public 
officials” had to prove “actual malice” in order to sue a newspaper for 
libel. The state’s interest in protecting the reputation of public figures 
was subordinated to the right of individuals to criticize government 
officials. In Tinker v. Des Moines School Board, the Court found that 
students could not be punished for wearing a black armband as a protest 
against the Vietnam War unless it results in a “substantial disruption” to 
school activities.124 Even in an institution where discipline and order are 
paramount, the Court sided with the individual student’s right of 
expression. In Cohen v. California, the Justices extended First 
Amendment protections to the right to wear in a courthouse a jacket 
bearing the message, “Fuck the Draft.”125 The state was no longer even 
able to impose a sense of decorum for collective order in—of all places—
a courthouse. “The majority made it clear that an involuntary hearer’s 
interest in being shielded from offensive speech cannot be deemed a 
compelling interest justifying government censorship.”126 The individual’s 
right to speak prevailed. (I wonder how the present-day Supreme Court 
would treat an attendee wearing the exact same jacket at One First 
Street.127) One of the few outliers in this series was United States v. 
O’Brien, where the Court held that a war protestor could be prosecuted 
for burning his draft card, as the federal government’s interest in 
maintaining an effective selective service draft system trumped the 
individual right.128 
 
 123. 376 U.S. 250, 283 (1964). 
 124. 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969). 
 125. 403 U.S. 15, 16, 26 (1971). 
 126. Neuborne, supra note 38, at 112. 
 127. In oral arguments in Cohen v. California, Chief Justice Burger instructed counsel for 
petitioner, Mel Nimmer: “Mr. Nimmer, you may proceed whenever you’re ready. I might suggest to 
you that . . . the Court’s thoroughly familiar with the factual setting of this case and it will not be 
necessary for you, I’m sure, to dwell on the facts.” Transcript of Oral Argument, Cohen v. California, 
403 U.S. 215 (1971) (No. 299). His admonition to avoid cursing did not work as Nimmer said “fuck” 
roughly two minutes into his argument. Id. In stark contrast, in the 2008 oral arguments for Fox v. 
FCC, which considered whether the FCC could issue a fine for Bono, who said during a live broadcast 
“really, really fucking brilliant,” unfolded without expletives. During arguments, the advocates shied 
away from saying the actual word at the Supreme Court. Though, as Dahlia Lithwick recalls, the lawyers 
and judges “swore like sailors when this case was argued in the 2nd Circuit.” Dahlia Lithwick, Shit Doesn’t 
Happen, Slate (Nov. 4, 2008, 6:51 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/supreme_ 
court_dispatches/2008/11/shit_doesnt_happen.html. The closest Solicitor General Gregory Garre came to 
profanity was to suggest the Court had a role to stop “Big Bird dropping the F-bomb on Sesame 
Street.” Lithwick wryly observed, “it’s a bitterly disappointing day for those of us who’d looked 
forward to hearing some filthy words at the high court.” Id. In a related prudish moment from Fox v. 
FCC II, involving the broadcast of “buttocks” on television, former-Solicitor General Seth Waxman 
pointed out that there was nudity in the Court’s frieze. “There’s a bare buttock there, and there’s a 
bare buttock here. I had never focused on it before.” Justice Scalia replied, “Me neither.” Joan Biskupic, Top 
Justices Grapple with FCC Filters on Cursing, Nudity, USA Today (Jan. 1, 2012, 1:55 AM), http://usatoday30. 
usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/story/2012-01-10/supreme-court-broadcast-indecency/52482854/1. 
 128. 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968). 
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Neuborne dubs this period “the First Amendment era of good 
feelings” where the “right’s newly minted dedication to an expansive 
Free Speech clause was added to the reformist left’s longtime 
preoccupation with free speech.”129 What was the tipping point of this 
Pax Supremana? Neuborne charts its ascent from the “1960s with the 
civil rights movement and reaching its apogee in the 1989 and 1990 flag-
burning cases”130 like Texas v. Johnson.131 Thirty years is a good run! 
One of the most noteworthy First Amendment victories during this 
period was Buckley v. Valeo.132 The ACLU, represented by Joel Gora, 
successfully argued that restrictions on campaign finance laws enacted in 
the wake of Watergate were unconstitutional. Since its inception, the 
ACLU had opposed limits on contributions to political campaigns, 
arguing vigorously that more speech was better. But not everyone was 
happy with Buckley, or at least with what came after it. 
Neuborne identifies Buckley as something of a turning point. To 
Neuborne, Buckley led the liberals and conservatives on the Court to 
“forge[] a strong free speech partnership” during the “First Amendment 
era of good feelings.”133 However, the decision gave the proverbial one 
percent a “tangible reason to celebrate a muscular First Amendment” 
and “corporate management a strong stake in the First Amendment.”134 
These tensions simmered for nearly two decades, but the internal dissent 
came two years shy of the new millennium. 
On June 19, 1998, a statement was released on behalf of eight 
persons who have served the ACLU “in [l]eadership [p]ositions 
[s]upporting the [c]onstitutionality of [e]fforts to [e]nact [r]easonable 
[c]ampaign [f]inance [r]eform.”135 The signatories represented, except for 
one, “every living person to have served as ACLU President, ACLU 
Executive Director, ACLU Legal Director, or ACLU Legislative 
Director during the past 30 years, with the exception of the current 
leadership.”136 The letter, which nearly a decade later would become the 
official position of the group, stated: “the First Amendment does not 
 
 129. Neuborne, supra note 38, at 113. 
 130. Id. 
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forbid content-neutral efforts to place reasonable limits on campaign 
spending.”137 
What is the purpose of the First Amendment? Presaging Breyer’s 
vision, it answers “to safeguard a functioning and fair democracy.”138 The 
letter faults Buckley, which “failed to recognize that there is a compelling 
interest in defending democracy that justifies reasonable spending 
limits.”139 Providing such robust protection for free speech “magnifies the 
political influence of extremely wealthy individuals and distorts the 
fundamental principle of political equality underlying the First 
Amendment itself, causing great harm to the democratic principles that 
underlie the Constitution.”140 To this view, the First Amendment’s 
concerns for “political equality” and “democratic principles” outweigh 
the harm laws might impose on the freedom of speech. The signatories 
conclude: “Opponents of reform should no longer be permitted to hide 
behind an unjustified constitutional smokescreen.”141 
On June 19, the same day, columnist E. J. Dionne, Jr. wrote in the 
Washington Post that “[t]here’s been a major breakthrough in the battle 
to reform the campaign money system.”142 Dionne explained that “a 
group of luminaries from the [ACLU] has broken with the organization’s 
opposition to the principles underlying” legislation then pending before 
the House of Representatives.143 The divide officially spilled over into the 
public. For the next decade, the position of Neuborne and his colleagues 
would remain in the minority. 
But all of that changed in 2010. On April 19, 2010, almost three 
months to the date from the Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC,144 
the ACLU issued a press release titled “ACLU Board Addresses 
Campaign Finance Policy.”145 The ACLU’s National Board of Directors, 
by a “vote of 36-30, . . . revise[d] its policy on campaign finance 
regulation [in] . . . two ways.”146 First, the new policy “accepts spending 
limits as a condition of voluntary public financing plans.”147 Second, and 
more strikingly, the new policy “permits reasonable limits on campaign 
contributions to candidates.”148 This novel course was charted based on 
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an acknowledgement “that very large contributions to candidates may 
lead to undue influence or corruption and, at a minimum, have the 
appearance of impropriety and undermine public confidence in the 
electoral system’s integrity.”149 
The press release acknowledges quite candidly that “[t]his contrasts 
with prior policy, which opposed all such limits.”150 The old policy stated: 
“Limitations on contributions or expenditures made by individuals or 
organizations for the purpose of advocating causes or candidates in the 
public forum impinge directly on freedom of speech and association. 
Their implementation poses serious dangers to the First Amendment. 
They should be opposed in candidate as well as referenda elections.”151 In 
the span of three decades, the ACLU shifted from seeing such 
regulations as facially unconstitutional to being “reasonable.” 
The only limiting principle offered is that the ACLU “take[s] the 
position that is most consistent with protecting [civil liberties] to the 
fullest extent possible” in light of the “implications at stake.”152 At stake 
for what? Presumably in this situation, the implications are of protecting 
speech to democracy, more broadly. Stated simply, the release explains 
that the “regulation of the electoral campaign process must . . . assure 
integrity and inclusivity, encourage participation and protect rights of 
association while at the same time allowing for robust, full and free 
discussion and debate by and about the candidates and issues of the 
day.”153 
The press release offers a retrospective of how the ACLU reached 
this narrow vote of 36-30. (Perhaps fittingly, a 36-30 majority is roughly 
the same share as a 5-4 vote—the former eighty-three percent, the latter 
eighty percent.) A committee was formed in 2007—before Citizens 
United but after FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life154—“to review the 
ACLU’s campaign finance policy.”155 Preceding the April 2010 Board 
meeting, the committee reported in June 2009, October 2009, and 
January 2010. (Citizens United was scheduled for reargument in June 
2009, reargued in September 2009, and decided in January 2010). During 
that time, “committee members, as well as members of the full ACLU 
National Board, engaged in extensive deliberations and study and heard 
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from a panel of renowned First Amendment experts representing a broad 
array of diverse perspectives.”156 
The reaction to the new policy was vigorous. Two weeks later, the 
Wall Street Journal (“WSJ”) published an editorial titled, The ACLU 
Approves Limits on Speech: On Campaign Contributions, a Dramatic 
About-Face.157 It was authored by ACLU alumni Abrams, Ira Glasser 
(Executive Director of the ACLU from 1978 to 2001), and Joel Gora 
(counsel to ACLU who argued Buckley). The trio offered insight into the 
reversal of policy: “Over the objections of some key senior staff and by a 
very narrow vote, the ACLU National Board of Directors rejected core 
aspects of that longstanding policy earlier this month.”158 On the merits, 
the authors note that the policy is silent about what constitutes a 
“reasonable” limit. Therefore, they suggest, “the government will doubtless 
supply the definition.”159 The authors conclude that “[t]he premier First 
Amendment organization in America now favors limitations on the First 
Amendment in the area in which all agree it must have its most powerful 
application—political speech during election campaigns.”160 What is the 
reason for this reversal? The “rhetoric of egalitarianism has won a 
victory over freedom of speech.”161 Will it work? The authors are not so 
sanguine: “The new restrictions the ACLU supports will never bring about 
the equality it claims is its goal.”162 
The following week, Susan Herman, President of the ACLU Board 
of Directors, wrote a letter to the editor in response to the WSJ editorial, 
insisting that the ACLU “does not compromise [its] commitment” to 
serving as a “stalwart defender of the First Amendment.”163 But the reply 
does not challenge Abrams, Glasser, and Gora’s point. Consistent with 
the press release, Herman writes that “[p]olitical speech and the First 
Amendment right to engage in it freely is a cornerstone of our 
democracy, as is the integrity of our electoral process.”164 Herman adds 
that the decision “is an acknowledgment that very large contributions 
may lead to undue influence or corruption that can undermine the 
integrity of the electoral process.”165 This concedes that the ACLU now is 
weighing political equality and civil liberties. With respect to “reasonable 
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limits” on contributions to candidates, political equality trumps the civil 
liberty. The speech of the “collective” prevails over the speech of the 
“individual.”  
Three years later, the other shoe dropped. Professors Ronald 
Collins and David Skover note that “[b]etween 1976 and 2010, when it 
filed a brief contesting the campaign finance laws in Citizens United v. 
FEC, the national ACLU had filed fourteen briefs in the Supreme Court, 
all of them challenging various aspects of campaign reform laws.”166 The 
first case that broke this trend was McCutcheon. Before McCutcheon, 
“the ACLU participated in almost every important Supreme Court 
campaign finance case and took what some viewed as an absolutist First 
Amendment position by arguing against limitations on contributions, 
expenditures, or both.”167 However, following Citizens United, the 
authors explain, “the national ACLU pled the proverbial Fifth and went 
silent. It expressed no position in such cases either pending in or before 
the Supreme Court.”168 
The reasoning behind this new silence is complicated. Collins and 
Skover explain “there was division in the ranks. Some of the new ACLU 
guard broke away from the traditional party line. Some of them were no 
longer the tried and true defenders of the First Amendment when it 
came to campaign finance cases (and picketing near abortion clinics). Or 
as they saw it, money was ruining the American electoral system so badly 
that the First Amendment should not be invoked to defend its all-too-
harmful impacts on that system.”169 Roll Call reported that the “ACLU’s 
sensitivity to opposition within its ranks may help explain why the 
organization took no position on the McCutcheon v. FEC ruling.”170 
In response, Steven R. Shapiro, the legal director of the ACLU 
counters that Collins and Skover “are incorrect to suggest that the 
ACLU’s absence in McCutcheon v. FEC reflects a new sensitivity to 
‘divisions’ within the ACLU over the campaign finance question. The 
ACLU’s policy on campaign finance is among the most debated policies 
in the organization’s history.”171 Shapiro explains that campaign finance 
law “raises critical issues about political speech, the role of money in 
facilitating that speech, and democratic self-governance.”172 However, 
“despite repeated reexaminations, the ACLU” claims that it “has never 
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wavered from its position in favor of public financing and against 
restrictions on political expenditures.”173 The 2010 change in policy, 
Shapiro explains, did not concern “aggregate limits on contributions to 
candidates and political committees,”174 the issue in McCutcheon. As a 
result, Shapiro relayed, the ACLU “chose not to file when that issue was 
presented in McCutcheon, and for no other reason.”175 
Collins and Skover were not persuaded by Shapiro’s rejoinder 
concerning the “divisions” in the ACLU. First, the authors recall E.J. 
Dionne’s 1998 column in The Washington Post concerning the “major 
breakthrough” and “bitter debate” within the ACLU concerning 
campaign finance laws.176 Second, the duo note the fact that in the last six 
campaign finance cases, dueling briefs on both sides of the First 
Amendment were filed by the ACLU and “Former ACLU officials.”177 
Many of these former officials signed the 1998 statement. For example, 
during the October 2014 term, the ACLU and “Past Leaders of the 
ACLU” (Norman Dorsen, Aryeh Neier, Burt Neuborne, and John 
Shattuck) filed briefs on both sides of the “v” in Williams-Yulee v. 
Florida Bar,178 a judicial campaign financing case.179 
Notwithstanding the nuanced silence in McCutcheon, this evolution 
in the ACLU is still in motion. During the summer of 2014, the Senate 
considered a constitutional amendment that would give Congress the 
power to “regulate the raising and spending of money and in-kind 
equivalents with respect to Federal elections” in order “advance the 
fundamental principle of political equality for all.”180 On June 3, 2014, the 
ACLU formally opposed the proposed amendment, finding that it would 
“would severely limit the First Amendment, lead directly to government 
censorship of political speech and result in a host of unintended 
consequences that would undermine the goals the amendment has been 
introduced to advance—namely encouraging vigorous political dissent 
and providing voice to the voiceless, which we, of course, support.”181 
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Three months later, on the eve of the hearing before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, six former leaders of the ACLU—including five 
members of the 1998 statement—wrote a letter supporting the proposal 
to amend the Constitution. Reiterating the 1998 letter, the signatories 
charged that five Justices of the Supreme Court, relying on the “ACLU’s 
erroneous reading of the First Amendment as a fig leaf,” have “added 
huge multi-national corporations to the list of unlimited campaign 
spenders, and authorized wealthy individuals to contribute virtually 
unlimited sums to party leaders in a never-ending search for wealth-
driven political influence.”182 The letter faulted the Supreme Court and 
the National ACLU for “fail[ing] to recognize that political equality is a 
compelling interest that justifies reasonable limits on massive political 
spending.”183 In other words, political equality—and not just the 
elimination of corruption—is a compelling interest, so these laws survive 
strict scrutiny. The letter concluded by applauding the proposed 
amendment which would “overturn[] many of the Court’s narrow 5-4 
campaign finance precedents and implement[] generous, content neutral 
political spending limits [as] the best way to fulfill the promise of James 
Madison’s First Amendment as democracy’s best friend.”184 
After a divisive hearing in the Senate in September, the divide 
within the ACLU spilled further into the forefront. Neuborne, who 
“spearheaded the letter in response to” ACLU’s June letter, told Roll 
Call, “[t]here is a very, very significant divide within the ACLU on 
this.”185 Specifically, Roll Call reported that the Court’s decision in 
Citizens United has “put the ACLU’s national leaders even more out of 
step with the organization’s rank and file.”186 Neuborne adds, “There is 
within the organization very, very significant discontent with the existing 
position.”187 
Laura Murphy, director of the ACLU’s Washington legislative 
office—who signed the June letter—agreed with Neuborne, saying “I 
think that there is a deep divide within the ACLU about this issue,” but 
stressed that “we are taking positions that are supported by our national 
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board.”188 Murphy added that the “letter is meant to confuse 
congressional staff about who speaks for the ACLU,” and she has no 
respect “for this eleventh hour ‘sham issue advocacy.’”189 At an event at 
the Cato Institute, Nadine Strossen echoed these sentiments: “Those of 
us who are First Amendment absolutists have been losing some ground, 
although I am happy to say that in contrast to former ACLU leaders, the 
current ACLU is very strongly opposing, and effectively opposing, the 
proposed constitutional amendment on this ground.”190 The emphasis on 
“current” is my own. It is unclear how long this line will hold, given the 
already fractured ACLU. 
Recently, a kerfuffle emerged over the ACLU’s 2015 “Workplan.” 
As Professor Ron Collins noted, excluded from the eleven priorities the 
organization listed—including “reproductive rights,” “freedom to marry,” 
and “mass incarceration”—was the freedom of speech.191 Professor 
Howard Wasserman offered a guess of “one possible (if not entirely 
accurate) answer: We won. There are no ‘major civil liberties battles’ to 
be fought or won with respect to the freedom of speech.”192 Anthony 
Romero, the Executive Director of the ACLU replied that “The ACLU 
is and has always been fully committed to protecting free speech, even 
when that speech may be offensive or controversial to many.”193 
However, perhaps giving credence to Wasserman’s theory, Romero 
notes that “[the ACLU’s] First Amendment freedom of expression work 
is somewhat unique in that a large share of it involves responding to 
threats or incidents that occur on the local level and not generally as part 
of a broader, coordinated threat to freedom of expression.”194 
The ACLU does not operate in a vacuum. The position the 
organization adopts represents broader trends regarding speech and civil 
liberties. 
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2. The Collective Justices 
The simmering intellectual revolt within the ACLU served as a 
harbinger of the shift on the high court. So goes the ACLU, so goes the 
Supreme Court. In 2010, Justice Stevens—as the senior member in 
dissent—assigned himself the Citizens United dissent. The opinion, which 
would have upheld the campaign finance regulation, attempted to adhere 
to longstanding First Amendment precedents. Indeed, Stevens faulted 
the majority for overruling the Court’s 1990 decision in Austin v. 
Michigan Chamber of Commerce.195  
But McCutcheon was different. The liberal bloc could have written a 
straightforward but powerful dissent, arguing that the aggregate limits 
served the purpose of reducing corruption in politics. There was no need 
to reimagine the First Amendment. But reimagine, it did. The effort to 
ground the First Amendment in distortions from Holmes, Brandeis, and 
Madison was entirely superfluous unless it was designed to build the 
basis for further rulings to promote “collective speech.” The dissent 
reads like the foundation—albeit a cracked one—for a new vision of the 
First Amendment. 
While Breyer has been quite open about his views of a narrow First 
Amendment freedom—dissenting alone in Brown v. Entertainment 
Merchants Ass’n196 and Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.197—what makes 
McCutcheon so significant is that he is joined by his progressive 
compatriots. Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan all endorsed his 
vision of collective speech. With Justice Stevens gone, Justice 
Ginsburg—who now had the highest seniority—assigned the dissent to 
Breyer, knowing how he would approach the issue. Floyd Abrams 
explains that the “most surprising and disturbing” element of 
McCutcheon was the dissent, “for the first time, Justices Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan join [] Justice Stephen 
Breyer’s minimization of long-recognized and well-established First 
Amendment interests by maintaining that, after all, the side seeking to 
overcome those interests had at least as strong a First Amendment 
argument on its side.”198 In light of Breyer’s dissent, this assignment—
with no noted dissension—augurs a broader jurisprudential shift on the 
left. 
Perhaps this line of thinking will be confined to the doctrine of 
campaign finance law. Justice Kagan had previously commented that her 
decision in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n199 to invalidate a 
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statute regulating the sale of violent video games to minors “was the case 
where I struggled most and thought most often I’m on the wrong side of 
it.”200 She added, “I sweated over that mightily.”201 She explained at an 
event at the Aspen Institute that she ultimately joined the majority 
because she “couldn’t figure out how to square that with our First 
Amendment precedents and precedent is very important to me.”202 To 
Kagan at least then, precedent matters. On the other hand, Breyer 
discounted these precedents, and dissented in Brown, finding that the 
state has a paramount interest in limiting speech to protect children from 
psychological harms from violent video games.203 But these precedents 
are not set in stone, and in many respects, are severely undercut by the 
new line of thinking established by the McCutcheon dissent. 
Perhaps a recent case suggests the further development of this 
doctrine. In Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans,204 
Justice Breyer wrote the majority opinion in a 5-4 decision upholding the 
state’s power to prohibit specialized license plates bearing the 
Confederate battle flag. In keeping with his views toward collective 
speech, Breyer construed the license plate as a form of “government 
speech,” rather than the speech of the individual group that designed the 
plate. He explained, “When government speaks, it is not barred by the 
Free Speech Clause from determining the content of what it says. That 
freedom in part reflects the fact that it is the democratic electoral process 
that first and foremost provides a check on government speech.”205 Here 
too, Breyer views the political process as the check on speech, rather 
than the other way around. Indeed, in this case, the state openly 
censored license plates designed by Texans that it deemed offensive—
what the dissent labeled as “blatant viewpoint discrimination.”206 As 
Justice Alito framed it in his dissent, “[t]he Court’s decision passes off 
private speech as government speech and, in doing so, establishes a 
precedent that threatens private speech that government finds 
displeasing.”207 This, Alito charges, is “dangerous reasoning.”208 After 
spending seventeen pages on the government’s perspective, Breyer closes 
with but a mere paragraph on the “free speech rights of private persons,” 
that clumsily equates the state being unable to compel private speech 
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with an individual being unable to compel government speech.209 This 
decision evinces strong shades of the collective liberty that pervades 
McCutcheon. 
Floyd Abrams referred to the dissent in McCutcheon as a 
“disturbing and recurring reality,” and “deeply disquieting.”210 Abrams 
notes that significant unanimous decisions of the Court, “would be at risk 
if the First Amendment were somehow viewed as anything but a 
limitation on the government’s power to limit speech, even in the 
supposed service of ‘preserving democratic order,’ vindicating ‘collective 
speech,’ or the like.”211 First, consider Mills v. Alabama.212 Alabama 
enacted a law that ostensibly prohibited a newspaper from publishing an 
editorial on election day “in support of or in opposition to any 
proposition that is being voted on.”213 The law was passed ostensibly with 
a “pro-democratic intent.”214 The Alabama Supreme Court found that 
the law “protects the public from confusive [sic] last-minute charges and 
countercharges and the distribution of propaganda in an effort to 
influence voters on an election day.”215 
Sounds like the rationale against releasing The Hillary Movie before 
the election in 2008, doesn’t it? These were the facts in Citizens United. 
In that case, the district court observed the FEC could prohibit the 
release of the movie because it was “susceptible of no other 
interpretation than to inform the electorate that Senator Clinton is unfit 
for office, that the United States would be a dangerous place in a 
President Hillary Clinton world, and that viewers should vote against 
her.”216 Similarly, recall that when Citizens United was first argued, 
Deputy Solicitor General Malcolm Stewart told Justice Alito that the 
government could ban a book that criticized a candidate, if it was paid 
for by corporate contributions.217 When then-Solicitor General Kagan 
 
 209. Id. at 2252. 
 210. Abrams, supra note 15. 
 211. Id. 
 212. 384 U.S. 214 (1966). 
 213. Id. at 216. 
 214. Abrams, supra note 15. 
 215. Mills, 284 U.S. at 219 (quoting Alabama v. Mills, 176 So. 2d 884, 890 (Ala. 1965)). 
 216. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 279 (D.D.C. 2008). In an irony 
too rich for reality, Democratic Presidential nominee Hillary Clinton—who has tacitly endorsed at 
least two super PACs supporting her—told her top fundraisers of her litmus test so that any Justice 
she appoints would vote to overturn Citizens United. Matea Gold & Anne Gearan, Hillary Clinton’s 
Litmus Test for Supreme Court Nominees: A Pledge to Overturn Citizens United, Wash. Post (May 14, 
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/05/14/hillary-clintons-litmus-test- 
for-supreme-court-nominees-a-pledge-to-overturn-citizens-united/. 
 217. Transcript of Oral Argument at 26–28, Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 
(2010) (No. 08-205).  
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reargued the case, she wisely backed off an answer that Justice Alito 
called a “stunner,” but was compelled by the government’s position.218 
In Mills, the Warren Court unanimously rejected the rationale that 
too much speech might be a bad thing. The Court found that “no test of 
reasonableness”—even one that protects the collective speech rights of 
the populace—“can save a state law from invalidation as a violation of 
the First Amendment when that law makes it a crime for a newspaper 
editor to do no more than urge people to vote one way or another in a 
publicly held election.”219 Abrams commented “Mills held the statute 
unconstitutional, regardless of its supposedly pro-democratic intent of 
protecting a potentially confused and misled public.”220 Applying the 
“collective liberty” approach reflected in the Citizens United dissent 
would have required upholding the Alabama law. 
“What about Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo?”221 Abrams 
asks. In this case, the Court invalidated a Florida law that required a 
right-of-reply for any candidate who was criticized in a newspaper.222 
What could be “more democratic, more consistent with public 
participation in the creation of public policy,” Abrams asks, “than a 
right-of-reply statute which assures that if a candidate was attacked on 
the basis of his personal character or official record by a newspaper, that 
he should have the chance to respond?”223 Especially where—in a line 
right out of the Citizens United dissent—“the power to inform the 
American people and shape public opinion” has been “place[d] in a few 
hands” of wealthy media conglomerates.224 Would this law not improve 
the strength of the “chain” between the populace and elected 
representatives? 
Characterizing the supporters of the Florida law, Chief Justice 
Burger observed that “[t]he First Amendment interest of the public in 
being informed is said to be in peril because the ‘marketplace of ideas’ is 
today a monopoly controlled by the owners of the market.”225 Sound 
familiar? This argument could have also come straight from the Citizens 
United dissent. The Court acknowledges that a “responsible press is an 
undoubtedly desirable goal”—paying homage to Justice Breyer’s desire 
for democracy—but still unanimously struck down the law because 
“press responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution and like many 
 
 218. Josh Blackman, Recap of Federalist Society 30th Anniversary Gala Dinner with Remarks by 
Justice Alito #FedSoc2012, Josh Blackman’s Blog (Nov. 16, 2012), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2012/ 
11/16/recap-of-federalist-society-30th-anniversary-gala-dinner-with-remarks-by-justice-alito-fedsoc2012/. 
 219. Mills, 284 U.S. at 220. 
 220. Abrams, supra note 15. 
 221. 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
 222. Id. 
 223. Abrams, supra note 15. 
 224. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 250. 
 225. Id. 
Blackman_23 (Dukanovic) (Do Not Delete) 3/21/2016 10:18 PM 
April 2016] COLLECTIVE LIBERTY 655 
other virtues it cannot be legislated.”226 Neither of these precedents 
would be safe if the “collective liberty” mentality is taken to its logical 
conclusions. 
This new progressive bloc potentially reflects a huge shift on the 
Court with respect to civil liberties. Neuborne characterizes the 
dissenting quartet as “tend[ing] to approach the First Amendment as an 
aspirational partnership between speakers and hearers aimed at 
preserving human dignity and improving the efficient functioning of 
institutions dependent on informed free choice.”227 Neuborne sees 
himself as continuing the new experiment from Justice Breyer, who has 
“begun to root his aspirational reading of the Constitution in respect for 
democratic governance.”228 Rather than speaking in terms of “collective 
speech,” Neuborne posits that our individualistic “[c]urrent First 
Amendment doctrine . . . aggrandizes the speaker (including conduits 
dressed up as speakers), subordinates the hearer, ignores the speech 
target, and demonizes the government regulator.”229 But the costs of this 
doctrine have begun to chip away at the shiny veneer of “speech is speech,” 
Neuborne explains. “A steady diet of speaker-obsessed deregulatory free-
speech doctrine has begun to expose its costs to Madisonian democracy 
and to the larger social partnership between speakers and hearers that 
supports it.”230 What is the response to this demolition of democracy? 
“The time may be ripe for a modest political shake-up in Mr. Madison’s 
First Amendment neighborhood.”231 In other words, collective speech. 
During a discussion about Neuborne’s book at NYU Law School, 
Justice Sotomayor asked, “You say that the focus of the First Amendment 
is democracy. You invite your thesis as a different way of interpreting the 
Constitution. So who decides what promotes democracy?”232 Neuborne 
replied jokingly, “I’m sort of shocked that you asked that, because it’s 
clear that I define it.”233 The Justice comically shot back, “No, no, no, you 
forget, I do.”234 Though she was no doubt kidding, based on the tenor of 
the event, there is a startling kernel of truth to her comment. The logical 
implication of Justice Breyer’s theory is that the Court must place itself 
in the position to decide which speech promotes democracy and relegate 
all other types of speech to the constitutional ash heap. But to that, 
Neuborne answered, “I would rather have judges asking” what results in 
 
 226. Id. 
 227. Neuborne, supra note 38, at 109. 
 228. Id. at 11. 
 229. Id. at 115 (emphasis added). 
 230. Id. at 116. 
 231. Id.  
 232. Justice Sonia Sotomayor Joins Burt Neuborne and Trevor Morrison to Discuss Madison’s Music, 
NYU L. (Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.law.nyu.edu/news/sonia-sotomayor-burt-neuborne-madisons-music. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. 
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“a good democracy or a bad democracy” than “pretending to decide the 
case by deciding what seven words” of the First Amendment means 
“without even thinking about the consequences for democracy.”235 So 
here is the divide. Rather than understanding what the Constitution 
actually means, the collectivists will instead disregard speech inconsistent 
with their personal views of democracy. 
While the Justices are not quite there yet, Neuborne is onto 
something.236 In my 2010 editorial, co-authored with David E. Bernstein, 
we worried that “Breyer’s apparent ascendance as doyen of the Court’s 
liberal wing threatens to roll back decades of pro-liberty precedents, and 
to destroy the consensus on the Court that freedom of speech and other 
essential rights must not be sacrificed to the shifting whims of legislative 
majorities.”237 We might be inching closer to that radical revolution in 
constitutional law. And unlike in the past, where stalwarts such as the 
ACLU could be counted on to defend this most fundamental civil liberty, 
the evolution on the Court has mirrored the evolution of the Bar. 
II.  Collective Exercise 
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and its statutory 
cousin, RFRA have followed a similar trajectory as free speech, between 
the collective and the individual conceptions of liberty. During the 
heyday of the Warren Court, the Justices embraced the Free Exercise 
Clause as a wedge to carve out exemptions from generally applicable 
laws that imposed a “substantial burden” on faith. However, decades 
later this individual right gave way to the collectivist mentality ushered in 
by Justice Scalia’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith.238 It was for 
the democratic process, and not the courts, to provide extra protections 
for faith. However, Congress responded by tugging the religiosity of the 
nation back toward the individual through the then popular RFRA. 
After a brief period of prosperity, RFRA was dragged back into 
controversy, this time by the conservatives, who recognized an exemption 
for Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. from the ACA’s contraceptive mandate. 
Now, it is the progressives who lash out against the individualistic free 
exercise right, and instead sought to let the democratic process decide 
which carve outs were suitable. The pendulum continues to swing. 
 
 235. Id. 
 236. Neuborne, supra note 38, at 109. 
 237. David E. Bernstein & Josh Blackman, Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer Shows Progressive 
Streak, NJ.com (July 12, 2011, 11:24 AM), http://blog.nj.com/njv_guest_blog/2011/07/supreme_court_ 
justice_stephen.html. 
 238. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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A. SHERBERT Individualizes Free Exercise 
In the 1963 decision of Sherbert v. Verner,239 the Warren Court set 
the stage for the development of an individualist notion of the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The case involved a classic 
clash between majority and minority faiths. Adell Sherbert, a member of 
the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, observed the Sabbath on Saturday.240 
South Carolina determined that the only day of rest that could excuse 
someone from working would be Sunday, the traditional Sabbath for 
almost all Christian religions. Which interest would trump: the individual’s 
faith or society’s recognition of which exercises of faith ought to be 
protected? Stated differently, would the state’s determination that 
Sunday was the proper day of rest outweigh an individual’s determination 
that Saturday was the proper day of rest? The Court, by a vote of 7-2, 
chose the former. 
To resolve this quandary, the Court puts forth this test: for the denial 
of benefits to be valid, “it must be either because her disqualification as a 
beneficiary represents no infringement by the State of her constitutional 
rights of free exercise, or because any incidental burden on the free 
exercise of appellant’s religion may be justified by a ‘compelling state 
interest in the regulation of a subject within the State’s constitutional 
power to regulate.’”241 As Justice Brennan framed the issue for the 
majority, the lower court’s “ruling forces [Sherbert] to choose between 
following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one 
hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to 
accept work, on the other hand.”242 Further, compounding this injury is 
that the law “saves the Sunday worshipper from having to make the kind 
of choice which we here hold infringes the Sabbatarian’s religious 
liberty.”243 The policy, though one of general applicability, violated the 
Free Exercise Clause. 
The dissent by Justices Harlan and White (the latter joined the 
majority opinion in Smith twenty-seven years later), explained that the 
“South Carolina Supreme Court has uniformly applied this law in 
conformity with its clearly expressed purpose”: excluding benefits if 
“unemployment has resulted not from the inability of industry to provide 
a job but rather from personal circumstances, no matter how compelling.”244 
Rather than being based on any religions notions, the conclusion was 
mandated because “virtually all of the mills in the Spartanburg area were 
operating on a six-day week,” and she was not “discriminated against . . . 
 
 239. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 240. Id. at 399. 
 241. Id. at 403 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)). 
 242. Id. at 404. 
 243. Id. at 406. 
 244. Id. at 419 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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on the basis of her religious beliefs.”245 What the Court’s holding does, 
the dissenters explain, is require the Constitution to be read to “compel 
[the] to carve out [of] an exception—and to provide benefits—for those 
whose unavailability is due to their religious convictions.”246 The rule of 
Shebert would prevail for nearly three decades. 
B. SMITH Collectivizes Free Exercise 
The criticisms of Sherbert became pronounced throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s. The conservative wing of the Court, led by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist “had been championing a retreat from the ‘liberal’ Free 
Exercise Clause view for years.”247 This shift culminated in the 1990 
decision of Employment Division v. Smith.248 Alfred Smith was 
terminated by his employer for his ingestion of peyote—a powerful 
hallucinogen—taken in the course of his Native American religious 
ceremonies.249 Smith challenged the subsequent denial of unemployment 
benefits based on the drug use as a violation of the First Amendment’s 
Free Exercise Clause.250 In a controversial decision by Justice Scalia, the 
Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise Clause could not be used as a 
defense against a law of general applicability.251 The Court rejected the 
Sherbert framework, finding that “many laws will not meet the test” and 
that it “required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost 
every conceivable kind.”252 Further, the Court added, “danger increases 
in direct proportion to the society’s diversity of religious beliefs.”253 These 
exemptions include “laws providing for equal opportunity for the 
races.”254 The First Amendment, Scalia explained, does not require this 
result.255 Justice Scalia determined that the Constitution did not allow 
courts to be in the business of exempting people from the laws based on 
their religious beliefs. 
 
 245. Id. at 41920 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 246. Id. at 420 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 247. Eugene Volokh, Many Liberals’ (Sensible) Retreat from the Old Justice Brennan/ACLU Position 
on Religious Exemptions, Wash. Post (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2015/04/01/many-liberals-sensible-retreat-from-the-old-justice-brennanaclu-position-on- 
religious-exemptions/. 
 248. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 249. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 872 (1990). 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. at 888. 
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How should the diverse “religious preference[s]” of our “cosmopolitan 
nation” be protected?256 The answer—as Justice Breyer would explain in a 
different context—is democracy. “Values that are protected against 
government interference through enshrinement in the Bill of Rights are 
not thereby banished from the political process,” writes Scalia.257  
Just as a society that believes in the negative protection accorded to 
the press by the First Amendment is likely to enact laws that 
affirmatively foster the dissemination of the printed word, so also a 
society that believes in the negative protection accorded to religious 
belief can be expected to be solicitous of that value in its legislation as 
well.258  
In other words, the political process can protect minority religious beliefs, 
in much the same way that this process protects minority free speech. 
Three decades after Sherbert, Justice Brennan found his opinion 
discarded by Smith, and joined Justice O’Connor’s dissent for four 
justices. The dissent would have retained Sherbert, for free exercise is not 
a collective right subject to the democratic process, but rather an 
“individual religious liberty.”259 Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen 
laments that the majority, all “judicial conservatives,” engaged in an 
“utterly unforced error,” as the Justices who would otherwise “support a 
broad construction of First Amendment freedoms” failed to “embrace[] 
the overriding value of religious liberty.”260 The job of “defend[ing the] 
Free Exercise [C]lause as a substantive freedom fell to the three 
dissenting liberals.”261 
With this decision, free exercise immediately became more of a 
collective right, protected so long as the legislature deemed that it served 
some higher purpose—and generally the principle motivating these laws 
was equality and no exceptions. In the final paragraph of the Court’s 
opinion, Justice Scalia concedes this weakness of his conclusion: “It may 
fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will 
place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not 
widely engaged in.”262 In other words, like with speech, the political 
process will not protect minority beliefs. 
South Carolinians who observe the Sabbath on Sunday would have 
no problem seeking exemptions from the legislature, but Seventh-Day 
 
 256. Id. at 888 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961)); see also Town of Greece v. 
Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1849 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he American community is today, 
as it long has been, a rich mosaic of religious faiths.”). 
 257. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. at 891 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 260. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Justice Scalia’s Worst Opinion, Pub. Discourse (Apr. 17, 2015), 
http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2015/04/14844/. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (emphasis added); see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. 
Ct. 2751, 2787 (2014) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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Adventists would be out of luck. Christians would have no problem 
seeking an exemption from prohibition to use sacramental wine, but 
Alfred Smith could not realistically seek a peyote exemption. Nonetheless, 
Scalia writes, the “unavoidable consequence of democratic government 
must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto 
itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against 
the centrality of all religious beliefs.”263 Justice Scalia wanted the Court to 
get out of the business of carving out exemptions for every religion 
imaginable, even noting that certain minority faiths might be burdened 
substantially. This is collective exercise—religious exercise is protected 
by the Constitution only so long as it promotes a greater societal good. 
The parallel between Smith and Justice Breyer’s McCutcheon dissent is 
striking. We will return to this juxtaposition later. 
C. Restoring the Individual Free Exercise Clause 
The reaction to the “collective” notion of free exercise articulated in 
Smith resulted in a massive political backlash. How could a person be 
punished for exercising sincerely held religious beliefs when an 
accommodation was so easy? How could it be that people of faith could 
only turn to the legislature to seek exemptions from generally applicable 
laws? How could religious minorities, who lack the clout of the 
mainstream faiths, possibly seek such largesse from state governments? 
These questions, occasioned by Justice Scalia’s majority opinion, led to 
the federal RFRA. 
In 1993, then-Representative Charles Schumer of New York 
introduced RFRA in the House of Representatives.264 Its counterpart bill 
in the Senate was co-sponsored by Senator Edward Kennedy. RFRA was 
supported by the “ACLU joined with a broad coalition of religious and 
civil liberties groups, including People for the American Way [and] the 
National Association of Evangelicals.”265 The bill enjoyed such wide-
ranging bipartisan support that it passed the House on a voice vote, 
passed the Senate by a vote of ninety-seven to three, and was promptly 
signed into law by President Clinton. Imagine such a significant law 
passing today with this kind of vote! 
The law states that the federal “Government shall not substantially 
burden a person’s exercise of religion” unless it “is in furtherance of a 
compelling governmental interest” and “is the least restrictive means of 
furthering that compelling governmental interest.”266 At a minimum, 
 
 263. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. 
 264. Chuck Schumer on RFRA (C-SPAN television broadcast May 11, 1993). 
 265. The ACLU and Freedom of Religion and Belief, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/religion-belief/ 
aclu-and-freedom-religion-and-belief (last visited Apr. 10, 2016). 
 266. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb to 2000bb-4). 
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RFRA attempted to reverse the Court’s collective construction of the 
Free Exercise Clause in Smith and restore Justice Brennan’s 
individualistic notion of free exercise. Whether it did more is an open 
question. 
The first decade of RFRA was not controversial. Consider Gonzales 
v. O Centro Espirita.267 This case involved a “small American branch” of 
a “religious sect with origins in the Amazon Rainforest [that] receives 
communion by drinking a sacramental tea, brewed from plants unique to 
the region, that contains a hallucinogen regulated under the Controlled 
Substances Act [(“CSA”)] by the Federal Government.”268 In facts 
analogous to Smith, the Court applied RFRA rather than the Free 
Exercise Clause to unanimously rule against the government. The group 
was entitled to a religious accommodation from the CSA because of 
RFRA. Once again, free exercise was treated as an individual right. 
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court recognized the difficulty 
of applying the “compelling interest test.” The Court conceded, 
[The] task assigned by Congress to the courts under RFRA is [not] an 
easy one. Indeed, the very sort of difficulties highlighted by the 
Government here were cited by this Court in deciding that the 
approach later mandated by Congress under RFRA was not required 
as a matter of constitutional law under the Free Exercise Clause.269  
But because this was a statute that can be modified easily if it does not 
work well—unlike the First Amendment—the Court was comfortable in 
complying with Congress’s mandate “that courts should strike sensible 
balances, pursuant to a compelling interest test that requires the 
Government to address the particular practice at issue.”270 Viewed as a 
way to resurrect Brennan’s protection of individual exercise, or as means 
to prevent the government from infringing on the rights of religious 
minorities, RFRA was designed to restore Sherbert and repudiate Smith. 
Or at least that was the plan. 
D. BURWELL V. HOBBY LOBBY STORES 
But then a funny thing happened on the way to health care utopia. 
Regulations implementing the ACA imposed a mandate on all large 
employers—both for-profit and nonprofit—to provide insurance that 
covers emergency contraceptives, commonly known as abortifacients. 
 
 267. 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
 268. Id. at 423. 
 269. Id. at 439 (citing Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 88590 
(1990)). 
 270. Id. To this point, Justice Scalia recently noted that he “would not have enacted” RLUIPA, 
Congress’s spending-power workaround to the partially-invalidated RFRA. Josh Blackman, Justice 
Scalia Would Not Have Enacted RLUIPA? What About RFRA?, Josh Blackman’s Blog (Oct. 8, 2014), 
http://joshblackman.com/blog/2014/10/08/justice-scalia-would-not-have-enacted-rluipa-what-about-rfra/. 
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RFRA, which was designed to protect religious minorities, was hoisted as 
a tool for corporations to exempt themselves from a law of general 
applicability, citing a substantial burden on their religious exercise. In 
Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court recognized that closely held for-profit 
corporations were protected by RFRA, and that requiring these 
corporations to pay for insurance plans that include certain emergency 
contraceptives violated their religious exercise.271 
Before delving into the RFRA analysis, it is worth pausing to 
inquire how the contraceptive mandate came to be. Contrary to how it 
has been portrayed in the media, the ACA has no actual contraceptive 
mandate.272 Section 300gg-13 of the ACA provides that employer-
sponsored health insurance “shall, at a minimum provide coverage for 
and shall not impose any cost sharing requirements for . . . with respect to 
women, such additional preventative care and screenings not described in 
paragraph [one] as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported 
by the Health Resources and Services Administration [(“HRSA”)].”273 
The “preventative care and screening” products “with respect to 
women” were deliberately not defined. 
HRSA “in turn consulted the Institute of Medicine, a nonprofit 
group of volunteer advisers, in determining which preventive services to 
require.”274 On February 15, 2012—nearly two years after the ACA was 
signed into law—HRSA issued a proposed regulation that “nonexempt 
employers are generally required to provide ‘coverage, without cost 
sharing’ for ‘[a]ll Food and Drug Administration [(“FDA”)] approved 
contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education 
and counseling.’”275 That included drugs viewed as abortifacients. The 
contents of the contraceptive mandate came from the Institute of 
Medicine, not Congress. The leadership in Congress no doubt knew this 
would happen, as reflected in the legislative history cited in Justice 
Ginsburg’s dissent, but they did not have the votes to do so themselves. 
Why is this history relevant? Because had majoritarian politics been 
involved in 2010, the ACA would have never included such a mandate. 
 
 271. O Centro, 546 U.S. at 439. 
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The specific birth control products were deliberately not named. In order 
to avoid even more controversy with Pro-Life Democrats, led by Bart 
Stupak276—who only signed onto the ACA based on a feckless executive 
order from the President277—Congress kicked the can and delegated the 
all important task of deciding which contraceptives must be provided by 
employer-sponsored plans to the HRSA. Had these details been in the 
bill, it likely would have never passed. Indeed during oral arguments, 
Justice Kennedy questioned how an administrative agency could 
determine what a compelling interest is and which religious groups 
should be exempted. He stated (for Justice Kennedy seldom asks actual 
questions), “But when we have a First Amendment issue of this 
consequence, shouldn’t we indicate that it’s for the Congress, not the 
agency, to determine that this corporation gets the exemption on that 
one, and not even for RFRA purposes, for other purposes.”278 
But the faceless bureaucracy that imposed the contraceptive 
mandate—with little attention for religious conviction279—may well be a 
harbinger of future decisions by a more secular state. When individual 
exercise begins to exert negative externalities on nonbelievers, a 
collective free exercise right becomes much more attractive. And so the 
pendulum has swung back. 
III.  From Individual Liberty to Collective Liberty 
How do we make sense of the shifting of positions of individuals and 
organizations of conservative and liberal persuasions on speech and 
exercise? The calculus reduces down to three questions: Who is 
benefiting? Who is harmed? What is the purpose of the right? For the 
first question, consider whether the beneficiary is someone like Mary 
Beth Tinker, who wore a black armband at school to protest the war, or 
like Shaun McCutcheon, who sought to donate millions of dollars to 
dozens of candidates nationwide. For the second question, consider the 
relatively trivial costs associated with providing unemployment benefits 
 
 276. Brief of Democrats for Life of America & Bart Stupak as Amici Curiae Supporting Hobby 
Lobby et al., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (Nos.13-354 & 13-356). 
 277. Josh Blackman, Unprecedented: The Constitutional Challenge to Obamacare 75 (2013) 
(“Hours after Stupak reached this compromise, Tribe emailed Kagan, expressing incredulity that the 
ACA was about to be passed ‘with the Stupak group accepting the magic of what amounts to a signing 
statement on steroids!’ Tribe stated the obvious, and what any first-year constitutional law student 
would know—that Schmidt was right. The president’s signing statement with respect to abortion was 
legally impotent.”). 
 278. Adam J. White, Kennedy’s Question: How Will the Court Decide Hobby Lobby?, Wkly. 
Standard (Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/kennedy-s-question_787038.html; 
see also Ilya Shapiro & Josh Blackman, What Next Year’s Attack on Obamacare Will Look Like, Daily 
Beast (Sept. 29, 2015, 1:00 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/09/29/what-next-year-s- 
attack-on-obamacare-will-look-like.html. 
 279. See Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Little Sisters of 
the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell (No. 15-105). 
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to Alfred Smith, the Native American who ingested peyote, compared to 
the significant costs of denying contraceptive coverage for female 
employees of Hobby Lobby. For the third question, consider whether the 
purpose of rights is to promote the unburdened liberty of Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc. to exercise its religious beliefs, or to ensure the equality of its 
female employees to have coverage for contraceptives. The answers to 
these questions speak volumes of how the Justices, from both flanks, as 
well as liberal and conservative groups in the public, have perceived 
rights as individual or collective liberties. 
A. The Beneficiary of Individual Liberty 
In different generations, free speech benefited different groups. During 
the Warren and Burger Courts, many First Amendment cases involved a 
puritanical state attempting to suppress some sort of antiestablishment 
message. Consider the parties asserting the First Amendment: Mary Beth 
Tinker, who sought to wear a black armband at school to protest the 
Vietnam War;280 Paul Robert Cohen who wore a jacket emblazoned with 
“Fuck the Draft” in a courthouse;281 David Paul O’Brien who burned his 
draft card.282 First Amendment cases not concerning the war dealt with 
civil rights: The New York Times published a potentially libelous attack 
on the Police Commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama;283 the NAACP 
refused to publish their membership list.284 For speech, these judgments 
concerned war protesters and civil rights advocates. In all instances, the 
proverbial establishment was attempting to suppress speech that conflicted 
with the state’s goals. In response, the activists were sticking it to the man. 
A similar dynamic prevailed for Free Exercise cases. All of the 
parties before the Court were members of minority faiths, that the state 
was not interested in creating exemptions for: Sherbert, the Seventh-Day 
Adventist who declined to work on Saturday;285 the Amish Jonas Yoder 
who refused to send his teenage children to compulsory public schools;286 
Roy Torcaso the atheist who was denied a commission as a Maryland 
notary public because he would not declare his belief in God;287 (from a 
different era) Alfred Smith who was denied unemployment benefits 
because he ingested peyote in a Native American ceremony.288 
 
 280. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 281. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
 282. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
 283. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 284. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
 285. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 286. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 287. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). 
 288. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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It was against this backdrop that many scholars viewed RFRA—the 
Free Exercise Clause’s statutory cousin—as designed to protect 
“minority” religions, not the “majority” Christian faiths. Professor Howard 
Friedman wrote on his influential blog, Religion Clause, “Traditionally it 
was assumed that the federal RFRA would be used by minority religions 
to fend off broad regulations that might be enacted without a careful 
weighing of idiosyncratic religious practices that are important to often 
discrete and insular groups with comparatively small numbers of 
adherents.”289 Professor Eric Segall adds that “RFRA was enacted in 
response to a kind of inequality among religions . . . [and practices that] 
had a discriminatory impact on religious minorities.”290 How so? 
Traditionally, any law that intruded on religion would have legislative 
carve outs to suit the needs of majority religions. For example, laws 
prohibiting alcohol would invariably have carve outs for sacramental 
wine because Christians would lobby the legislative process. However 
Native Americans who ingest peyote would be out of luck when the 
legislature is considering drug laws.291 For exercise, these rulings 
protected religious minorities from the puritanical views of the mainstream 
faiths. 
Today, we have very different plaintiffs. Gone are Mary Beth 
Tinker and Alfred Smith. Instead, we have Citizens United that uses 
corporate contributions to produce a film critical of Hillary Clinton; 
Shaun McCutcheon who refuses to abide by an aggregate cap of 
$123,200; and Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. that refuses to provide insurance 
covering abortifacients for its employees. Adam Liptak cogently 
summarized the shift in The New York Times: “Liberals used to love the 
First Amendment. But that was in an era when courts used it mostly to 
protect powerless people like civil rights activists and war protesters.”292 
The juxtaposition between the protestor wearing the “Fuck the Draft” 
jacket in Cohen v. California and the partisan Citizens United 
corporation could not be starker. 
 
 289. Howard Friedman, Why Is Indiana’s RFRA so Controversial? This Blogger’s Analysis, 
Religion Clause (Mar. 30, 2015, 9:05 PM), http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2015/03/why-is-indianas-
rfra-so-controversial.html (emphasis added); cf. Josh Blackman, Is Indiana Protecting Discrimination?, 
Nat’l Rev. (Mar. 30, 2015, 4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/416160/indiana-protecting- 
discrimination-josh-blackman (discussing how the recent backlash against Indiana’s RFRA overlooks 
the context from which other state RFRAs evolved). 
 290. Eric Segall, Religious Exemptions, Religious Equality, and Religious Preferences, Dorf on L. 
(Apr. 10, 2015), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2015/04/religious-exemptions-religious-equality.html. 
 291. Compare American Indian Religious Freedom Act and its post-Smith 1994 amendments 
protecting the use of peyote as a sacrament in traditional religious ceremonies. See American Indian 
Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (1994). 
 292. Adam Liptak, First Amendment, ‘Patron Saint’ of Protestors, Is Embraced by Corporations, 
N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 2015, at A14. 
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Lincoln Caplan observed that the First Amendment’s “most fervent 
champions are not standing up for mistrusted outsiders . . . or for the 
dispossessed and powerless. Today’s advocates do the bidding of 
insiders—the super-rich and the ultra-powerful, the airline, drug, 
petroleum and tobacco industries, all the winners in America’s winner-
take-all society.”293 Empirically, the liberals might be right. As Professor 
John C. Coates, IV told Liptak, based on a new study he conducted,294 
“‘Corporations have begun to displace individuals as the direct 
beneficiaries of the First Amendment [and the trend is] recent but 
accelerating.’”295 
Floyd Abrams concedes the point: “There is truth in the proposition 
that a number of recent First Amendment victories in recent years have 
been on behalf of the ‘haves’—some of them corporations, some 
individuals. But that is no basis for concluding that the decisions were 
wrongly analyzed or wrongly decided.”296 In other words, who cares who 
is benefitting from free speech? Picking and choosing the correct and 
incorrect beneficiaries of the First Amendment is a task ill-suited for 
courts and one that undermines the free flow of ideas from all groups 
that wish to speak. Abrams adds, 
My First Amendment leads me to favor more speech, not less, on 
campus. And more speech, not less, in our elections. And more speech, 
not less, by corporations. And unions. And individuals. To me, then, 
the issue is not who benefits from reading the First Amendment 
broadly. It is that we all lose by reading it narrowly.297 
Nadine Strossen, former president of the ACLU, dismisses the 
concerns of the “many pundits who have been saying, ‘Oh, this is going 
to benefit Republicans, or benefit conservatives, or benefit big business.’ 
Not at all!”298 Rather, Citizens United “unshackle[d] all corporations, 
including nonprofit corporations, such as the ACLU, which itself was 
mentioned.299 Strossen stressed that the “[t]he benefits of added free 
speech, and added voices, and added opinions will go across the political 
spectrum.”300 Strossen explained at the Cato Institute’s Constitution Day 
panel on the First Amendment that “[m]any of us believe that [what] 
democracy is all about is that you vote for a candidate [and] you give 
 
 293. Collins, supra note 105. 
 294. John C. Coates, IV, Corporate Speech and the First Amendment: History, Data, and 
Implications, 30 Const. Comment. 223, 224 (2015) (finding “[n]early half of First Amendment 
challenges now benefit business corporations and trade groups, rather than other kinds of 
organizations or individuals”). 
 295. Liptak, supra note 292. 
 296. Collins, supra note 105. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Collins & Skover, supra note 166. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. 
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money to a candidate because you want that person to share and be 
responsive to your concerns. That’s is [sic] not corruption; that is 
democracy.”301 Strossen also recognized the cost of her First Amendment 
support, stating that her “defense of letting money speak has, in most of 
[her] circles, caused [her] to be called a ‘puppet of plutocracy’ and not a 
champion of liberty.”302 
Should it matter that the First Amendment is now being used to 
shield the proverbial one percent at the cost to the ninety-nine percent? 
This framing of the question presumes that speech is only protected so 
long as it protects the correct audience. This conclusion underscores the 
significance of the McCutcheon dissent’s adoption of a utilitarian vision 
of speech, which is protected, so long as it contributes to “democracy.” 
With this framework, the interests of Citizens United or Shaun 
McCutcheon are not viewed on the same level as Mary Beth Tinker or 
Paul Robert Cohen. Similarly, the visceral reaction to affording RFRA 
protections to Hobby Lobby, a profitable corporation, was premised on a 
tacit acceptance that the beneficiary belonged to the powerful and 
majority faith in society. To this view, free exercise exists to protect minority 
religious groups could not seek redress through the legislative process. 
The shift in who has benefited from recent First Amendment 
decisions helps to explain the shift on the right and left toward individual 
and collective liberty. But, more pronounced than the identity of the 
beneficiary is who absorbs the negative externalities of individual liberty. 
B. The Internalizers of Individual Liberty’s Externalities 
In many of the First Amendment cases discussed in the previous 
Subpart, the beneficiaries of the liberty interest were the proverbial 
have-nots. In those cases, the social cost, or externality, of 
accommodating the downtrodden’s liberty interest was slight and easily 
absorbed by the state.303 Consider the costs: the minimal disruption to 
Mary Beth Tinker’s classroom; the lack of decorum from Cohen’s “Fuck 
the Draft” jacket; the frustration of the selective service process from 
draft card burning (this more weighty impact was found to be sufficient 
to suppress the speech interest); the cost to the reputation of L.B. 
Sullivan who could not pursue his libel suit; and the State of Alabama 
that could not access the membership roster of the NAACP. For free 
exercise, the costs were even more minimal: providing unemployment 
benefits to Sherbert the Seventh-Day Adventist; accepting that the 
Amish youth would suffer from a lack of education; not having a public 
notary swear to god; and having to pay benefits to Alfred Smith who 
 
 301. Collins, supra note 190. 
 302. Id. 
 303. See Blackman, supra note 112, for a discussion of the “social cost” of constitutional rights. 
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ingested peyote, notwithstanding drug laws. In all cases, the costs were 
small and were absorbed by the state, not third parties. 
Where are we today? The costs are greater and are inflicted on 
private parties. Groups like Citizens United can seek contributions from 
profitable corporations to influence public opinion and shape the 
outcome of elections. Millionaires like Shaun McCutcheon, and even 
billionaires, can make contributions to as many political races as they 
wish, no longer subject to an aggregate cap. Professor Tim Wu stated the 
issue succinctly with respect to the First Amendment: “Once the patron 
saint of protesters and the disenfranchised, the First Amendment has 
become the darling of economic libertarians and corporate lawyers who 
have recognized its power to immunize private enterprise from legal 
restraint.”304 With respect to free exercise, corporations like Hobby Lobby 
are not required to provide insurance covering emergency contraceptives 
for their female employees. Under the Health and Human Services 
(“HHS”) accommodation, the insurance companies pick up that bill and 
that cost is ultimately passed onto government and taxpayers. Unlike the 
religious accommodation cases of days gone by, today’s accommodations 
impose social costs on nonbelievers. 
The New York Times summarized the reversal:  
An informal coalition of liberals and conservatives endorsed the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act because it seemed to protect 
members of vulnerable religious minorities from punishment for the 
exercise of their beliefs. [. . .] But over time, court decisions and 
conservative legal initiatives started to change the meaning of those 
laws, according to liberal activists. The state laws were not used to 
protect minorities, these critics say, but to allow some religious groups 
to undermine the rights of women, gays and lesbians or other groups.305  
The New York Times quoted Eunice Rho, an ACLU lawyer, who 
noted the “coalition broke apart over the civil rights issues.”306 Stated 
differently, the civil rights issue of equality trumped the civil liberties 
issue of free exercise. Consider the next wave of cases that will test the 
intersection of religious freedom and equality: RFRA as applied to 
antidiscrimination laws. 
1. RFRA and Discrimination 
After City of Boerne v. Flores307 invalidated the federal RFRA as 
applied to the federal government, nineteen states enacted local RFRAs 
 
 304. Tim Wu, The Right to Evade Regulation: How Corporations Hijacked the First Amendment, 
New Republic (June 2, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/113294/how-corporations-hijacked-
first-amendment-evade-regulation. 
 305. Erik Eckholm, Religious Protection Laws, Once Called Shields, Are Now Seen as Cudgels, 
N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 2015, at A12. 
 306. Id. 
 307. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
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that were substantially similar to the federal law.308 One of the biggest 
questions over both the federal and state RFRAs concerns whether they 
can be used as a defense in a private cause of action where the 
government is not a party. In other words, could a private party, when 
sued under some law of general applicability, seek an accommodation 
from the court by claiming that the enforcement of the law would impose 
a “substantial burden” on her exercise of religion. This issue has divided 
the federal courts. The Second, Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits held 
that RFRA could be used as a defense; the Sixth and Seventh Circuits 
held that it could not.309 
In 1996—three years after RFRA was enacted—the D.C. Circuit 
held that the Catholic University of America could raise RFRA as a 
defense against a sex discrimination claim brought by a nun and the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) alike.310 In 
1998, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that a church could 
assert RFRA as a defense against a trustee in bankruptcy proceedings.311 
In a 2000 decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, one church 
sued another church for unlawfully using materials copyrighted by its late 
pastor.312 The court allowed the infringing church to raise the defense, 
but found that the application of the copyright law did not impose a 
“substantial burden” on its exercise of religion. 
In a 2005 decision by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, a priest 
was forced to retire by the New York Methodist Church when he turned 
seventy.313 The priest brought an age discrimination claim, and the 
Church countered that enforcing the law would burden its religious 
exercise. The Second Circuit found that “RFRA’s language surely seems 
broad enough to encompass” the Church raising RFRA as a defense 
against the age discrimination claim.314 In short, Judge Ralph Winter 
wrote that RFRA “easily covers” the Church’s claim that applying the 
antidiscrimination law could “substantially burden” its exercise of 
religion.315 
These four cases, and many others, concerned similar facts—private 
parties brought suits against corporations. (Yes, Catholic University and 
churches are corporations.) In each case, the corporate defendants were 
 
 308. Hunter Schwarz, 19 States That Have ‘Religious Freedom’ Laws Like Indiana’s That No One 
Is Boycotting, Wash. Post (Mar. 27, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2015/03/ 
27/19-states-that-have-religious-freedom-laws-like-indianas-that-no-one-is-boycotting/. 
 309. Shruti Chaganti, Note, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Provides a Defense in Suits 
by Private Plaintiffs, 99 Va. L.R. 343, 344 (2013). 
 310. EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 468–69 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 311. Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 141 F.3d 854, 863 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 312. Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, 227 F.3d 1110, 1120–21 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 313. Hankins v. Lyght, 441 F.3d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 314. Id. at 103. 
 315. Id. at 103–04. 
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allowed to raise RFRA as a defense to assert that the enforcement of 
federal law—Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination, bankruptcy 
law, and even trademark law—burdened their religious exercise. In some 
cases, the defenses were successful, and in most they were not. This is the 
rule of law in virtually half the states in the union under the jurisdiction 
of these four circuits—and until recently, it was not particularly 
controversial. 
Joining the Second, Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits in finding that 
RFRA can be asserted as a defense in a private cause of action was the 
Justice Department. In August of 2012, the U.S. Government stated that 
Wheaton College, if sued by an employee for failing to provide 
contraceptives under the ACA’s mandate, “in its defense of such an 
action, would have an opportunity to raise its contention that the 
contraceptive coverage requirement violates” RFRA.316 (Granted, this 
position was taken before the Court made clear that RFRA extends to 
for-profit corporations, a position the Justice Department opposed.) 
But not everyone agreed. Taking the opposing view was then-circuit 
judge and now-Justice Sotomayor, who dissented in the Second Circuit’s 
Methodist Church case.317 She found that RFRA “does not apply to 
disputes between private parties.”318 Second Circuit Judge Ralph Winter 
responded forcefully to Sotomayor’s suggestion: “The [dissent’s] 
narrowing interpretation—permitting the assertion of the RFRA as a 
defense only when relief is also sought against a governmental party—
involves a convoluted drawing of a hardly inevitable negative 
implication. If such a limitation was intended, Congress chose a most 
awkward way of inserting it.” 
Joining Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting view are the Sixth and 
Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeal. Shruti Chaganti dubs these courts the 
“non-defense circuits” that held that RFRA was meant to “provide a 
defense only when obtaining appropriate relief against a government and 
therefore cannot apply to suits in which the government is not a party.”319 
In 2010, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the “Creation 
Seventh Day Adventist Church” could not raise RFRA as a defense in a 
trademark infringement suit brought by the “Seventh-Day Adventist 
Church.”320 In 2006, weighing in for the Seventh Circuit was the 
ubiquitous Judge Richard Posner. In this age discrimination claim 
 
 316. Defendants’ Reply in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss, Wheaton Coll. v. Sebelius, 703 
F.3d 551 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (No. 1:12-cv-01169-ESH). 
 317. Hankins, 441 F.3d at 109 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 318. Id. 
 319. Chaganti, supra note 309, at 344. 
 320. Gen. Conf. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, 617 F.3d 402, 410–11 (6th Cir. 2010). 
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brought by an organist against a Catholic Diocese, Posner wrote, “RFRA 
is applicable only to suits to which the government is a party.”321 
The state courts, like the federal courts, have also wrestled over 
whether state RFRAs can be raised as defense in private suits. Most 
notable among these decisions is the New Mexico Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Elane Photography v. Wilcox.322 In this now famous case, as 
Justice Ginsburg described it in her Hobby Lobby dissent, a “for-profit 
photography business owned by a husband and wife refused to 
photograph a lesbian couple’s commitment ceremony based on the 
religious beliefs of the company’s owners,” and was fined by the state 
Human Rights Commission as a result.323 The Land of Enchantment’s 
high court, mirroring Sotomayor and Posner’s narrow reading, concluded 
that the photographer could not raise the state RFRA as a defense 
against a discrimination claim. The U.S. Supreme Court declined to 
review this case. 
This brings us to the Hoosier State. Section 9 of Indiana’s 
controversial RFRA provides that “[a] person whose exercise of religion 
has been substantially burdened, or is likely to be substantially burdened, 
by a violation of this chapter may assert the violation or impending 
violation as a claim or defense in a judicial or administrative proceeding, 
regardless of whether the state or any other governmental entity is a 
party to the proceeding.”324 In the wake of Elane Photography, the 
Indiana RFRA made explicit for its own laws what the four federal 
courts of appeals and the Obama Justice Department already recognized 
about the federal counterpart. Indiana’s RFRA does no more than codify 
that the private enforcement of public laws—including discrimination 
claims—can be defended against with free exercise rights. 
Neither the Indiana, nor federal RFRA provides automatic 
immunity to discrimination claims. It only allows a defendant to raise a 
defense, which a finder of fact must consider and balance against the 
state’s compelling interest in eradicating discrimination.325 Similar 
analyses pertain to other defenses that can be raised under Title VII, the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, or the Americans with 
Disabilities Act. In 2012, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the 
“ministerial exception” prevents a teacher from bringing a disability 
discrimination suit against her employer, a Church.326 But what RFRA 
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(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb to 2000bb-4). 
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does do is create the opportunity—though slim—for courts to carve out 
further exemptions from generally applicable discrimination laws. The 
threat of this happening yielded a massive backlash against the law.327 As 
Eugene Volokh notes, “once broadly supported, [RFRAs] are now 
controversial. Many people, chiefly on the left, have criticized such laws, 
in large part on the grounds that RFRAs might let religious objectors 
claim exemptions from antidiscrimination law—especially with regard to 
state and local laws that ban discrimination based on sexual orientation.”328 
While the concern was overstated in light of how RFRA has been 
enforced for twenty years, the specter of exempting discrimination claims 
was raised by Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Smith, and promptly 
discounted by Justice O’Connor’s dissent. Scalia’s collectivist free 
exercise right would offer no refuge for discrimination defenses. But the 
dissent’s individual right could permit this imposition of social cost on 
nonbelievers, even in the form of discriminations. 
First, as a threshold matter, the four courts of appeals that 
interpreted RFRA as providing a defense in a private cause of action 
have a plausible claim that they are acting consistently with Sherbert. As 
Volokh observes, “the old Sherbert-era Free Exercise Clause would 
surely have applied to such private lawsuits as well.”329 Only one year 
after Sherbert, the Court decided the landmark case of New York Times 
Co. v. Sullivan330—again a corporation exercising First Amendment 
rights—holding that the First Amendment could be raised as a defense 
against a libel suit, even where the government is not a party.331 Justice 
Brennan, author of both the Sherbert and Sullivan opinions, wrote, “It 
matters not that that law has been applied in a civil action and that it is 
common law only, though supplemented by statute. The test is not the 
form in which state power has been applied but, whatever the form, 
whether such power has in fact been exercised.”332 Brennan explains, 
“What a State may not constitutionally bring about by means of a 
criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach of its civil law of libel.”333 
The law applies equally to private and public causes of action. Because of 
 
 327. Ironically, many corporations used corporate funds to oppose this law—the exact behavior 
the government asserted it could prohibit in Citizens United. Josh Blackman, Could Indiana Block 
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the “pall of fear and timidity imposed upon those who would give voice 
to public criticism,” the “civil libel is ‘a form of regulation that creates 
hazards to protected freedoms markedly greater than those that attend 
reliance upon the criminal law.’”334 In this sense, civil liberties are even 
more in doubt when a private party, rather than the state, can bring a 
civil suit. 
Volokh explains that Sullivan’s “logic extended beyond that, and 
the Court has routinely applied the First Amendment to a wide range of 
other civil litigation brought by private individuals.”335 What is true for 
the Free Speech and Free Press Clauses of the First Amendment “would 
surely have been true . . . for the Free Exercise Clause.”336 Additionally, 
Shelley v. Kraemer337 stands for a similar proposition, as a private suit 
concerning a racially restricted covenant can be challenged on the 
grounds that its judicial enforcement violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. 
Second, it is the Brennan-esque individual notion of free exercise 
that allows people of conscience to seek accommodations from generally 
applicable laws. In contrast, Smith repudiated that doctrine, and got 
courts out of the business of carving out exemptions for faiths. Ironically, 
the very same progressives that ridiculed Justice Scalia’s decision to stop 
judicially imposed religious accommodation now seek a return to his 
equality driven collectivist framework for religious liberty. Volokh wryly 
observes: “Justice Scalia’s opinion [in] Employment Division v. Smith left 
most religious exemption questions to ‘the political process.’ The modern 
RFRA skeptics have embraced that.”338 The irony, Volokh explains, is 
that “RFRAs largely implement the religious exemption rules that 
Justice Brennan and the ACLU had long argued for—and that Justice 
Brennan and the ACLU had sharply criticized Justice Scalia and others 
for overruling” in Employment Division v. Smith.339 But what changed? 
The beneficiaries of the law and who bore the cost. 
Third, Justice Brennan’s opinions specifically countenanced that 
religious freedom could be raised as a defense against discrimination, but 
courts were “quite capable” of balancing those interests. Among the 
“parade of horribles” the Smith dissent dismissed,340 Justice Scalia 
mentioned that the Free Exercise Clause could be used to seek 
exemptions from “laws providing for equality of opportunity for the 
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races.” Scalia referenced Bob Jones University v. United States,341 that 
sought to employ a racially discriminatory admission policy, and prohibit 
interracial dating and marriage, while at the same time maintain its tax-
exempt status.342 Yes, Justice Scalia in overturning Sherbert specifically 
worried that parties might seek accommodations for discrimination 
based on religious belief. 
How did the Smith dissent reply to these charges that the Free 
Exercise Clause could permit discrimination? The same way that 
supporters of Indiana’s RFRA reply: RFRA only creates a balance 
where judges weigh the religious exercise against the state’s compelling 
interest in eradicating discrimination. Justice O’Connor explained “that 
courts have been quite capable of applying our free exercise 
jurisprudence to strike sensible balances between religious liberty and 
competing state interests.”343 
As the Court held seven years earlier in Bob Jones University, even 
though the University could assert an exemption from the tax-exempt 
rules for its racially discriminatory standards, the federal government 
“has a fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination 
in education . . . [that] substantially outweighs whatever burden denial of 
tax benefits places on petitioners’ exercise of their religious beliefs.”344 In 
other words, the compelling state interest of eliminating discrimination 
trumped religious liberty for the individual. The difficulty of applying the 
“compelling interest” test was not a reason “to reject” it altogether.345 
Justice O’Connor was perhaps proven correct that the courts could 
“strike [a] sensible balance.” 346 
This precise debate reemerged in Hobby Lobby, which considered 
whether the ACA’s contraceptive mandate violated the federal RFRA as 
applied to a closely held for-profit business.347 During oral arguments, 
Justice Kagan asked whether an employer could cite RFRA as a defense, 
relying on a “religious objection to sex discrimination laws . . . minimum 
wage laws . . . [or] child labor laws.”348 Paul Clement, representing Hobby 
Lobby, cited the same “parade of horribles” referenced in Smith:  
[E]very item on that list was included in Justice Scalia’s opinion for the 
Court in Smith. And Justice O’Connor responded to that in her 
separate opinion and she said, look, you’ve got to trust the courts; just 
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because free exercise claims are being brought doesn’t mean that the 
courts can’t separate the sheep from the goats.349  
In other words, merely raising a defense does not mean the defense will 
work. 
Justice Alito interjected, and asked Clement, “in all the years since 
RFRA has been on the books, has any of these claims involving 
minimum wage, for example, been brought and have they succeeded?”350 
Clement replied, “very few of these claims have been brought. Very few 
of them have succeeded, and that’s notwithstanding the fact that all of 
these statutes we’re talking about apply to employers generally.”351 
Presaging the kerfuffle in the Hoosier State, Kagan contended that if 
Hobby Lobby prevails, “religious objectors [will] come out of the 
woodwork with respect to all of these laws” and judges’ “hands would be 
bound when faced with all these challenges.”352 Presumably, when Kagan 
speaks of “religious objectors,” she is not talking about Amish seeking 
draft exemptions, or Native Americans seeking to ingest peyote, but 
Christians seeking exemptions from antidiscrimination laws. 
Following up on this exchange, in her dissent, Justice Ginsburg 
explained that Hobby Lobby “surely do[es] not stand alone as commercial 
enterprises seeking exemptions from generally applicable laws on the 
basis of their religious beliefs.”353 Ginsburg asks, “Would RFRA require 
exemptions in cases of this ilk? And if not, how does the Court divine 
which religious beliefs are worthy of accommodation, and which are 
not?”354 Was this not the exact question Justice Scalia posed to the Smith 
dissenters, and that Justice O’Connor shrugged off explaining courts 
were “quite capable” of balancing these interests? The déjà vu, between 
right and left, collective and individual, is striking. 
To support this conclusion, Justice Ginsburg has to reach far back in 
time to find examples where businesses claimed exemptions from 
discrimination laws by citing religious exercise, including a district of 
South Carolina case from 1966 and a Minnesota Supreme Court case 
from 1985.355 Yet, in each case, the court (unsurprisingly) ruled against 
the free exercise claim. The district court in South Carolina was not 
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“impressed by defendant Bessinger’s contention that the judicial 
enforcement of the public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 upon which this suit is predicated violates the free exercise of 
his religious beliefs in contravention of the First Amendment to the 
Constitution.”356 The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the claim that a 
sports clubs owners’ “sincere belief” and “interpretation of the Bible” 
allowed them to not employ “individuals living with but not married to a 
person of the opposite sex; a young, single woman working without her 
father’s consent or a married woman working without her husband’s 
consent . . . [and] fornicators and homosexuals.”357 Neither case supports 
Justice Ginsburg’s fear. 
The majority opinion in Hobby Lobby by Justice Alito promptly 
dispatched this point: “The principal dissent raises the possibility that 
discrimination in hiring, for example on the basis of race, might be 
cloaked as religious practice to escape legal sanction.”358 Justice Alito 
rejects this reasoning, noting that “Our decision today provides no such 
shield.”359 Consistent with how the Court characterized Bob Jones in 
Smith, Alito explained that “[t]he Government has a compelling interest 
in providing an equal opportunity to participate in the workforce without 
regard to race, and prohibitions on racial discrimination are precisely 
tailored to achieve that critical goal.”360 In other words, no amount of 
tailoring could ever permit the government to accommodate racial 
discrimination. These sorts of religious accommodations will never result 
in the social cost of permitting discrimination, the majority states. 
Notably, Justice Alito does not mention, gender, sexual orientation, or 
any other protected statuses. 
Herein lies the dichotomy between speech and religion. While the 
conservatives on the Court profess that the freedom of expression cannot 
be left to the whims of the “political process,” the same conservatives 
held that the freedom of exercise could be left to those whims. However, 
RFRA transforms free exercise back into the individual right for Justice 
Scalia and others. Meanwhile the liberals on the Court profess that the 
freedom of expression must be left to the higher goals of “collective 
speech” and at the same time they insist that the courts balance the 
intrusions on freedom of exercise when they conflict with the goals of the 
states. 
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2. The Social Costs of Free Exercise 
The perception of how Indiana’s RFRA would be perceived was 
premised on the social costs it imposes onto others, or more ominously, 
how future (state) courts could interpret the RFRA in light of the 
Court’s (imminent) ruling on same-sex marriage. In an important new 
article on religious liberty, Professors Douglas Nejaime and Reva Siegel 
compare and contrast the old “free exercise cases that RFRA invokes” 
with the new “complicity-based conscience claims” relied on by Hobby 
Lobby.361 Unlike the cases of days gone by, the modern species of free 
exercise cases will impose significant externalities on those who do not 
share the same faith. Nejaime and Siegel explain that traditionally 
RFRA “claims were advanced by religious minorities who sought 
exemptions based on unconventional beliefs generally not considered by 
lawmakers when they adopted the challenged laws; the costs of 
accommodating their claims were minimal and widely shared.”362 In 
contrast, the “complicity-based conscience claims” of today “harm those 
whose conduct the claimants view as sinful.”363 
This view has gained extra salience in the aftermath of Indiana’s 
RFRA experiment, and especially so after the Supreme Court’s decision 
recognizing a right to same-sex marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges.364 
Professor Friedman explains, “Since Hobby Lobby and the explosion of 
same-sex marriage cases, it is largely the Christian majority . . . that 
asserts it is the victim of the majoritarian process, seeking exemptions 
that have a negative impact on minority groups that have broadly been 
the victims of past governmental discrimination.”365 Professor Dale 
Carpenter puts a fine point on this theory: “What started out as a shield 
for minority religious practitioners like Native Americans and the Amish 
is in danger of being weaponized into a sword against civil rights.”366 Not 
only has RFRA been turned on its head, they argue, but also the victims 
of these accommodations are minorities and disadvantaged groups. 
Professor Michael Dorf similarly explained, “although the federal 
RFRA was inspired by a case involving a minority religion, RFRAs lately 
been used [sic] by people who adhere to conservative branches of 
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mainstream religions.”367 The necessary consequence of increasing the 
“number of people who seek eligibility for a RFRA exemption,” Dorf 
notes, is the “burden of providing accommodations becomes more 
concentrated.”368 Dorf adds, “the cost of the accommodation now falls on 
a non-believing subset of the population who are either themselves a 
minority or, if a majority, a bare one—at least in particular 
communities.”369 In other words, accommodating Native Americans 
seeking to ingest peyote pales in comparison with accommodating 
Christian corporations who oppose paying for abortifacients. So instead 
of “virtually the whole community absorbing the marginally small cost of 
providing an accommodation to a handful of people with idiosyncratic 
religious beliefs”—such as Native-American peyote use—“in the new 
contexts a RFRA begins to look like it enables one large faction of the 
population impose its religious beliefs on the rest of the population.”370 
With this understanding, Dorf concludes, “liberals, who hold anti-
Establishment values much more strongly than conservatives do, have 
another reason to be wary of RFRAs.”371 Professors Nejaime and Siegel 
explain that “few would affirm a result in which some citizens are singled 
out to bear significant costs of another’s religious exercise.”372 
The analogies between speech and religion are pronounced. With 
speech, many progressives fear that powerful, corporate interests can 
utilize the First Amendment to inflict negative externalities on groups 
with less means. This approach distorts the political process and 
democracy. Similarly, with religion, the liberal fear is that powerful, 
Christian interests can utilize RFRA to inflict negative externalities on 
disadvantaged groups. This approach distorts the political process and 
equality. In both cases, groups adverse to progressive goals are relying on 
constitutional individual liberties to harm others and thwart social 
justice. And because these groups are so much larger than the proverbial 
protestors burning draft cards or Native Americans ingesting peyote, the 
costs are far more concentrated. 
Conservatives, on the other hand—perhaps because of the changing 
demographics of who religious and speech liberties protect today—view 
both forms of liberty as essential to protect as rights unto themselves. But 
even then, instrumental to the majority opinion in Hobby Lobby, and in 
particular Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion, was the fact that the 
government could accommodate Hobby Lobby’s objection without 
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imposing any additional cost on its employees. According to the 
majority, the government simply passes the cost onto the insurance 
companies. (In reality, the insurance companies pass this cost onto 
consumers one way or the other, but we will accept this fuzzy math for 
argument’s sake.) Had the government been unable to accommodate 
Hobby Lobby without imposing costs on others, it is possible the calculus 
might have gone the other way. In this sense, the distance between the 
liberals and conservatives on RFRA might not be as broad as the gap 
with respect to free speech. 
C. The Purpose of Liberty 
What is the purpose of judicial protection of liberty? Does it exist 
unto itself, based on the idea that people who are free to choose will 
make the best decisions? Or, does it exist so long as it promotes the 
processes that will yield the “best” decisions for society? The problems 
inherent in each choice are apparent, and well-documented. For the former, 
people—not homo economicus—when left to their own devices, often make 
bad decisions that harm others. Here, liberty often yields inequality. For 
the latter, elites who decide what the “best” decisions are stifle autonomy 
and prevent individuals from deciding how to live their own lives. The 
desire for equality trumps liberty. 
With respect to free expression, the individualistic view that “speech 
is speech” is premised on the notion that more speech is better, and that 
with more information, people will be able to make the best decisions for 
their flourishing. The collectivist view rejects this naïveté, and contends 
that the state has a strong interest in eliminating the externalities from 
harmful speech. For free exercise, the individualistic view holds that faith 
is central to our civic society, and that government should avoid 
substantially burdening exercise whenever feasible, even if it shifts a cost 
onto society. The collectivist view counters that allowing exemptions for 
faith harms nonbelievers who do not enjoy the equal application of the 
law, even if religious exercise is burdened. The individualistic view is 
more willing to embrace liberty, while the collectivist view is grounded in 
promoting equality. 
The final inquiry to explain the shift from the individual to the 
collective is to understand how judicial protection of rights impacts 
liberty and equality. For speech, the failed experiment over the marketplace 
of ideas—where powerful voices drowned out the underprivileged—
resulted in a change to promote political equality, rather than allowing 
speech to flow freely. For exercise, the transition from minority faiths 
seeking minor exemptions to majority faiths seeking substantial exemptions 
vitiated the importance of religion in society, to the extent that it interferes 
with policies of social justice. 
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1. The Failed Speech Experiment 
Has the left left the First Amendment? Or has the First Amendment 
left the left? The divide within the ACLU suggests it might be a little bit 
of both. Consider the explanation of Neuborne, who writes that many 
progressives primarily supported free speech because they believed the 
marketplace of ideas would yield progressive goals, such as social and 
political equality.373 Through the early parts of the “twentieth century,” 
Neuborne recalls, “left-wing reformers, certain that their ideas were on 
the winning side of history, viewed robust free speech as an agent of 
change capable of destabilizing an oppressive and unequal status quo.”374 
In order to ensure that antiestablishment views—which the left was 
certain were the true and right ideals—were protected, other, less 
desirable forms of speech would receive similar scrutiny. It was worth it. 
This was the progressive experiment: “To the reformist American left, 
more speech meant more—and faster—social and economic change.”375 
The road to progressive utopia was paved with more speech. As 
Neuborne weighed the calculus, “[t]he future potential impact of a 
deregulatory First Amendment on the weak and the poor was deemed a 
small price to pay for the ability to invoke a robust free speech principle 
today in support of a more equal world.” With a majority on the Court, 
“the American left breathed a sigh of relief and awaited its inevitable 
triumph.”376 Giving protection to commercial speech was well worth the 
cost to promote equality. Or, at least, that was how the experiment was 
designed. 
But at the height of the Pax Supremana where speech was protected 
by the right and left, Neuborne explains, liberals realized something was 
amiss. “By 1990, some progressives began to suspect that they had made 
a bad First Amendment bargain.”377 The deal was not what they 
expected. What did they gain? Protection for “the rights of a couple of 
scruffy kids to burn flags” and “tepid protection for carefully constrained 
street demonstrations.”378 What did they lose from this grand pact? A lot 
more. The First Amendment now protected “uncontrolled campaign 
spending by the superrich—including corporations,” the “concentration 
of media power in a handful of huge corporations,” and “bursts of verbal 
venom aimed at historically weak hearers seeking access to education 
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and decent housing.”379 This outcome was “hardly a prescription for 
progress.”380 
Neuborne cynically suggests that many liberals joined the free 
speech experiment with the hopes that it would yield progressive goals, 
and not because they believed in the civil libertarian grounds for 
protecting “speech as speech.” Rather than the harmful speech being a 
necessary and ancillary evil to achieve the progressive society, the tail 
began to wag the dog, and it ran amok. Before they knew it, the liberals 
were bamboozled. “By 2000, the First Amendment era of good feelings 
was over, but not before the bipartisan coalition had generated an 
enormously powerful body of precedent establishing an imperial Free 
Speech Clause.”381 
The marketplace of ideas was a bold experiment. Speech was 
protected on the premise that if all voices were heard, the “best” idea 
would prevail. But what if this experiment turned out to be a failure? Or, 
what if liberals were wrong about what was actually “best”? Rather than 
serving as a marketplace, the arena of ideas turned into an auction, with 
the most powerful speech going to the highest bidder. This might explain 
why in McCutcheon, Justice Breyer could not bring himself to cite 
Holmes’s Abrams dissent as he no longer believed the experiment was 
worth trying. What if the incidental protection of those ancillary harmful 
expressions began to drown out the true, progressive ideals? What if 
speech was used not to promote the left’s “strong, redistributive 
government,” but rather the resurgent right’s “skeptical, deregulatory 
approach to government.”382 Speech, no longer serving the objectives of 
the collective, was no longer worthy of robust protection. Neuborne, 
perhaps speaking autobiographically of other similarly inclined liberals, 
began to realize that speech wasn’t serving the goals of political equality. 
Therefore, long-standing precedents on speech became expendable. 
A new framework was needed to ensure that the good speech 
continued, but the bad speech was regulated. Only that speech which 
promotes the progressive goals of “democracy” warrant scrutiny, and 
everything else can be cast aside. Deciding which speech does and does 
not serve democracy provides a judicial bypass to exclude interests 
inconsistent with social justice. This is the essence of “collective speech.” 
Perhaps Breyer’s shirking away from the First Amendment reflects what 
Neuborne sees as liberals who “began to view the bipartisan era as a 
Faustian bargain, far more likely to reinforce the status quo than 
destabilize it.”383 Returning to the progressive ideals of protecting speech 
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as a utilitarian concern, the argument goes, can get the country back on 
the right progressive track. 
But what about conservatives? The left was not alone with this shift, 
Neuborne posits. There was a time when “robust First Amendment” 
protection was the “bête noire of the American right.”384 Protecting the 
speech rights of hippies opposing the war and burning draft cards was a 
threat to the establishment, and threatened to drown out the message of 
social unity they preached. These conservatives, “appalled by the 
excesses of fascist lunatics . . . and confronted by an almost unbroken 
phalanx of academic support for leftist programs, did not look to the 
future with intellectual confidence.”385 For this generation of post-WWII 
conservatives promoted a “weak First Amendment,” shielding the 
country from the “likelihood of harm” posed by speech.386 While the left 
awaited their victory, “[t]he right hunkered down and vowed to fight on 
the beaches.”387 Though, armed with vigorous scrutiny and doctrine, 
conservatives settled in nicely with the modern First Amendment. 
Today, the precedent exists to offer robust protections for all speech, 
regardless of whether it is consistent with democracy or political equality. 
2. Conscience and Equality 
The identities of the beneficiaries of religious accommodations and 
who bears the burden of those accommodations can only explain in part 
the free exercise divide. Underlying these issues is the bedrock issue of 
the value of religion itself. As one scholar recently asked in a provocative 
book, why tolerate religion at all?388 The evolution of thought with 
respect to free exercise must be assessed against the background 
principles: What is the intrinsic value of faith itself? And how does that 
compare to the costs it inflicts on nonbelievers? If religion does not need 
to be tolerated, then the accommodation question is easily answered. 
Justice Breyer has explained that speech does not exist in a vacuum, 
and is protected so long as the democratic process deems its costs 
tolerable. The Hobby Lobby dissent, though not quite reaching this 
conclusion, can justify a similar understanding of free exercise. 
Conscience is not a value onto itself, but is protected so long as the 
democratic process deems its costs tolerable. Once you adopt this vision 
of religion, it becomes simple to disregard the intrinsic value of faith, in 
much the same way that the intrinsic value of speech gets brushed aside 
by Breyer. If the competing interests are mandating employer-provided 
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contraceptives and not requiring a profitable company to pay for those 
products, discounting the value of faith makes this balance a lot easier. 
Professor Mark DeGirolami points out that “[o]ne might have 
thought, even relatively recently, that religious freedom was a ‘civil 
right.’ But no longer: it is now said to be the enemy of ‘civil rights.’”389 
Stated succinctly by Professor Rick Garnett,  
[T]he conversation about how to manage the conflict between some 
religious-liberty claims and some equality and non-discrimination 
claims has to proceed from an appreciation for the facts that “religious 
liberty” *is* a civil right and that the enterprise of protecting civil 
rights includes—it has to include—care for religious liberty.390  
If religion is only valued so long as it serves utilitarian goals, then religion 
inconsistent with principles of equality or social justice, need not be 
protected.391 This is the crystallization of “collective liberty.” 
One of the clearest examples of this shift concerns whether the 
federal, state, and local governments should continue to offer tax-exempt 
status to institutions that do not sanction same-sex marriage.392 During 
oral arguments in Obergefell v. Hodges, Justice Alito asked the Solicitor 
General whether religious institutions that do not recognize same-sex 
marriage could keep their tax-exempt status—alluding to the Court’s 
earlier decision in Bob Jones.393 The Solicitor General answered, in what 
might be the understatement of the decade, “it’s certainly going to be an 
issue.” In the wake of Obergefell, a provocative editorial took up the 
Solicitor General’s prediction and argued that religious institutions that 
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discriminate against LGBT people should lose their tax-exempt status.394 
A recent survey revealed that forty percent of Americans and fifty-two 
percent of Democrats oppose granting tax-exempt status for religious 
organizations.395 
This trend shows no sign of abating. Looking forward to the year 
2050, “the spread of secularism will probably continue,” as “those who 
claim no religion will make up about a quarter of the population,” up 
from sixteen percent in 2010.396 As this influential demographic expands, 
the political protection of faith will fade into the twilight. This decline 
will be accelerated by the Supreme Court’s recognition that “moral 
disapproval” is no longer a rational basis to enact social legislation.397 
Even in the absence of a demographic shift, views toward religious 
accommodations have, and will change. “Without change in numbers or 
belief, religious actors can shift from speaking as a majority seeking to 
enforce traditional morality to speaking as a minority seeking exemptions 
from laws that offend traditional morality.”398 During his recent visit to the 
United States, Pope Francis aptly summarized the evolution: “Until 
recently, we lived in a social context where the similarities between the 
civil institution of marriage and the Christian sacrament were considerable 
and shared. The two were interrelated and mutually supportive. This is no 
longer the case.”399 
Christian Legal Society v. Martinez,400 though not a free exercise 
case, demonstrates the new approach to the First Amendment. Allowing 
an “all-comers” policy that is inclusive of everyone, regardless of who 
they are—is not only socially desirable as a matter of policy, but also 
constitutionally required under the First Amendment. In this new 
normal, the only religious beliefs that are acceptable by society are those 
that tolerate everyone equal.401 Individual exercise that does not coincide 
 
 394. Mark Oppenheimer, Now’s the Time to End Tax Exemptions for Religious Institutions, Time (June 
28, 2015), http://time.com/3939143/nows-the-time-to-end-tax-exemptions-for-religious-institutions/. 
 395. Josh Blackman, 40% of Americans, 52% Democrats, Oppose Tax-Exemptions for Religious 
Organizations, Josh Blackman’s Blog (Sept. 27, 2015), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2015/09/27/40- 
of-americans-52-of-democrats-oppose-tax-exemptions-for-religious-organizations/. 
 396. Laurie Goodstein, Muslims Projected to Outnumber Christians by 2100, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 
2015, at A14. 
 397. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (rejecting “moral disapproval” as a 
rationale to justify DOMA); cf. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2606 (2015). 
 398. Nejaime & Siegel, supra note 361, at 138. 
 399. Howard Friedman, Pope Francis Addresses Clergy Sex Abuse and New Definitions of Marriage, 
Religion Clause (Sept. 27, 2015), http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2015/09/pope-francis-addresses- 
clergy-sex-abuse.html. 
 400. 561 U.S. 661 (2010). 
 401. See Yossi Nehushtan, Intolerant Religion in a Tolerant-Liberal Democracy 1 (2015) 
(“The . . .  purpose of this book is to explain why religion should not be tolerated in a tolerant-liberal 
democracy. The more focused and explicit purpose of the book is to explain why a tolerant-liberal 
democracy should be reluctant to tolerate religious claims for accommodation.”). 
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with the collective virtues of the state need not be tolerated, and indeed 
should be shunned. Increasingly so, the primary goal of society will hew 
toward promoting equality rather than guaranteeing exercise. Society’s 
perception of Christianity, and other faiths, to the extent that their 
beliefs interfere with equality and social justice, will no longer be deemed 
worthy of the collective exercise rights of civil society. The concerns 
highlighted by Justice O’Connor’s Smith dissent—that the “political 
process” could not work things out—have proven true, as the political 
process moves away from free exercise and toward political equality. Or, 
viewed differently, Justice Scalia’s Smith opinion was vindicated, as the 
people, and not the courts can decide the proper scope of religious 
accommodations. 
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